University of North Florida

UNF Digital Commons
UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Student Scholarship

2015

Quasi-Subjectivity and Ethics in Non-Modernity
Justin T. Simpson
University of North Florida, diamondeye187@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Epistemology Commons, Ethics and Political
Philosophy Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons

Suggested Citation
Simpson, Justin T., "Quasi-Subjectivity and Ethics in Non-Modernity" (2015). UNF Graduate Theses and
Dissertations. 557.
https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/557

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open
access by the Student Scholarship at UNF Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNF
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Digital Projects.
© 2015 All Rights Reserved

Quasi-subjectivity and Ethics in Non-modernity
by
Justin Thomas Simpson

A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Practical Philosophy and Applied Ethics
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
April, 2015
Unpublished work c Justin Thomas Simpson

Certificate of Approval
“Quasi-subjectivity and Ethics in Non-modernity”
Justin Simpson
Approved by the thesis committee:

Date

______________________________________________
Erinn Gilson
Committee Chairperson/Assistant Professor of Philosophy

_______________________

______________________________________________
Bryan Bannon
Associate Professor

_______________________

______________________________________________
Hans-Herbert Koegler, Professor of Philosophy

_______________________

Accepted for the Department:
______________________________________________
Hans-Herbert Koegler
Chairperson, Department of Philosophy

_______________________

Accepted for the College:
____________________________________________
Barbara Hetrick
Dean of College of Arts and Sciences

_______________________

Accepted for the University:
______________________________________________
John Kantner
Dean of Graduate School

_______________________

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my sincere appreciation of Dr. Bryan Bannon and Dr. Erinn
Gilson for all the help and guidance they provided me throughout the completion of this
work. I am deeply indebted to both of them as the paper and the experience of writing it
would not have been the same without them. In particular, I am thankful to Bryan for his
encouragement in the beginning stages of the project and the time he devoted to our
many long and inspirational discussions which helped me think through the more abstract
ideas in Latour’s work. I am also grateful to Erinn for all her assistance in the actual
execution of writing the paper. Finally, I would like to thank my family, my mom and
dad as well as my two brothers, as they have always been a source of motivation and
emotional support over the years.

iv

TABLES OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

iii

Abstract

v

1. Modernity

1

2. Becoming What We Never Ceased to Be: Non-modern

15

3. Experimental Metaphysics and Quasi-objects

25

4. Quasi-subjectivity

37

5. Ethical Conclusions

52

References

69

v
ABSTACT
The inspiration behind this philosophical endeavor is an ethical one: interested in
what it means to flourish as a human being – how to live well and authentically. Similar
to medicine and how the ability to prescribe the appropriate treatment depends on first
making a diagnosis, the focus of this work will to be understand the human condition and
the ways in which subjectivity, one’s sense of self, is constituted. Given the general
dissatisfaction with the modern metaphysical picture of the world, which analyzes the
world in terms of the mutually exclusive and completely separate categories of
nature/objects and society/subjects, I proceed from an alternative conceptual perspective,
that of non-modernity, offered by Bruno Latour. By focusing on the actual practice of the
sciences Latour develops one of his central concepts: mediation. From this understanding
of the practices of mediation the world is revealed as an ontological continuum of hybrids
– mixtures of human and nonhuman elements – that ranges from quasi-object to quasisubject. Rather than being separate, nature and society are intimately interwoven and coconstituted, forming a nature-culture collective that is connected and defined by the
network of relations between existing hybrids. Given this philosophical landscape of
mediation, hybrids and networks, the question that I seek to address is how does this
effect what it means to be human? What does it mean to human living in a hybrid world?
I answer this question by articulating and developing Latour’s concept of quasi-subject.
This will ultimately amount to saying that as humans, our sense of self and agency is coconstituted through our networks of relations with both humans and nonhumans. I
conclude the paper by exploring some of the ethical implications that naturally emerge
from such an understanding.

Chapter 1: Modernity
Before jumping into the details it is worthwhile to briefly survey the different
parts of this paper and the way in which they fit together to present a coherent picture of
what it means to be human living in non-modernity and the ethical implications such an
understanding has. This paper focuses on the work of anthropologist and philosopher
Bruno Latour and develops on his non-modern perspective of the world. From his study
of the actual practices of so called moderns, Latour claims that we have really never been
modern. In order to understand this claim, chapter one addresses Latour’s depiction of the
central features of modernity such as its dualistic foundation which holds that everything
in the world can be sorted into one of two mutually exclusive and self-constituting
categories: Nature or society. Ultimately, Latour contends that the actual practices of
modernity not only involve the officially sanctified work of purification but also
mediation. Such practices of mediation gives rise to hybrid entities that defy the modern
constitution in that they bring together human and nonhuman elements, subject and
object properties, in a unified phenomenon. The chapter concludes with the unraveling of
modernity and how despite modern attempts to dismiss hybrids as mere intermediaries,
the very success of modernity leads to its own downfall as this success is accompanied by
an uncontrollable proliferation of recalcitrant hybrids that it unable sort. Chapter two then
looks at Latour’s non-modern response to the problems of modernity. Non-modernity can
be seen as an attempt to reconcile the practices of purification which differentiate nature
from culture with the practices of mediation from which hybrids arise. There are three
main concepts on which non-modernity is founded: mediation, hybrids and nature-culture
collectives. Rather than being composed of subjects of society and objects of Nature, the
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non-modern world is an ontological spectrum of hybrids such that everything is said to be
a hybrid. Around these practices and the resulting hybrids emerges a nature-culture
collective. This other main concept of non-modernity conveys the way in which nature
and culture are conceptually defined in relation to one another and causally linked.
Chapter three goes on to further articulate the non-modern perspective by considering the
way in which Latour sorts the world according to the concepts of quasi-objects and quasisubjects, which refer to the opposite ends of the continuum of hybrids. Unlike their
modern counterparts, quasi-objects have an existential and historical character, lack
clearly defined boundaries, and have productive capacities. In order to elucidate these
dimensions we turn to Latour’s experimental metaphysics and insights from actornetwork theory. With the Latourian stage set, the question for chapter four becomes how
does this understanding of non-modernity redefine human existence? What does it mean
to be human in relation to quasi-objects? While Latour’s concept of quasi-subject seems
to be the answer to these questions there is an apparent lack in discussion about it. By
connecting together disparate ideas throughout the works of Latour I attempt to sketch
what it means to human qua quasi-subject. Ultimately, what this amounts to is that
humans are relationally defined by others in a more expansive sense than previously
acknowledged. The most basic and distinguishing features of human existence – from
agency to identity to subjectivity – are not only constituted by our relationships with
other humans but also quasi-objects and nonhumans. Given this shift in understanding of
the human self, the final chapter seeks to take the first steps in charting out what a nonmodern ethic would look like.
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In order to understand Bruno Latour’s provocative and seemingly very
contentious assertion that we have never been modern we must first understand what
modernity means. In doing so, the unsatisfactory nature of modernity will come to
surface that prompts the need for something more which Latour is ultimately responding
to. Such an understanding will also help introduce and accentuate Latour’s non-modern
understanding of the world. To begin with, modernity is based on a dualistic constitution1
that holds the world can be organized into two entirely distinct and completely separate
categories: Nature and society. Everything is reducible to these ontological domains as
every being is either an object of Science or a subject of law and every phenomenon is
the result of either natural processes or social relations. Modernity, then, essentially
divides the world in two with an absolute cleavage that separates the assembly of
nonhumans from the assembly of humans.
Latour traces the advent of modernity to the dispute between Boyle and Hobbes
and the rise of the separate fields of science and politics which they each respectively led.
The two fields are held to be about two completely different matters that have nothing to
do with each other. Nor should they, as each sought to factor out and eliminate variables
from the other field; e.g. how science seeks to systematically weed out human
perspectives to achieve an objective account of nature. This split was representative of a
much deeper metaphysical view that natural and social things, as well as nature and
society as wholes, were two entirely different, closed spheres of existence operating with
different principles on different things. As such, Latour depicts Boyle and Hobbes as the
founding fathers of modernity, “…inventing our modern world, a world in which the
representation of things through the intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated
1

Similar to the constitution of nation-states, the modern constitution represents its core founding principles.
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from the representation of citizens through the intermediary of the social contract” (We
Have Never Been Modern 27). 2 Modernity’s metaphysical either-or lens produces a
double vision of the world such that things are to be seen either entirely in terms of the
domain of Nature or the domain of society, severing any direct relations between them. It
is because of this, and not mere oversight, Latour contends that political philosophers
have ignored Hobbes’s science while historians of science have ignored Boyle’s position
on the politics of science. The same holds true for Modernity’s understanding of itself,
which is explained only through social categories. Latour elucidates how “Modernity is
often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of ‘man’ or as a
way of announcing his death. But this habit itself is modern, because it remains
asymmetrical. It overlooks the simultaneous birth of ‘nonhumanity’ – things, or objects,
or beast…” (13).
Nature and society, nonhumans and humans, become forever dissociated due to
the dualistic constitution on which modernity is founded. This constitution holds these
conceptual categories to be entirely distinct and completely separate as self-evident
truths. They are completely separate in the sense that they are independent, autonomous
worlds that are self-constituting with no impact on each other. On the one hand with
Boyle, we get the first constitutional guarantee of modernity that “…it is not men who
make Nature; Nature has always existed and has always already been there; we are only
discovering its secrets” (30). With it comes the modern conception of Nature, with a
capital N, as a singular, autonomous, and totalizing whole that refers to the preexisting,
one true order of Nature. Nature operates via a fixed and stable set of unified and
2

This dissociation is also seen in the works of some of the most prominent thinkers of modern philosophy;
for instance Rene Descartes division between mind and body, and Immanuel Kant’s schism between nature
and morality.
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universal laws that remain the same regardless of what human think of them. The laws of
nature causally determine the movement of all natural beings through brute mechanism.
On the other hand, with Hobbes’ conception of the Leviathan we get the social category
of the republic that is defined purely by humans via the social contract. As Latour puts it,
“The Leviathan is made up only of citizens, calculations, agreements, or disputes. In
short, it is made up of nothing but social relations” (28). In this way society is also selfconstituting, being defined by only the respective like-minded members of its party and
the relations between them; which is the second guarantee of modernity: “…human
beings, and only human beings, are the ones who construct society and freely determine
their own destiny” (30). Thus, together, the first and second guarantees effectively
maintain the separation between state and Nature.
Next, the two categories are held to be entirely distinct in that they are mutually
exclusive, referring to things with opposite characteristics. Along with Boyle, science,
and Nature comes the intervention of a new actor, matters of fact – objects. According to
Latour, a natural object, as a matter of fact, is recognizable by having “…clear
boundaries, a well-defined essence, well-recognizable properties. It belonged without any
possible question to the world of things, a world made up of persistent, stubborn, nonmental entities defined by the strict laws of causality, efficacy…” (Politics of Nature 22).
Since the modern conception of Nature is ultimately a matter of necessity, in which
phenomena are given to causal laws and the immediacy of the conditions of their natural
environment, this gives rise to perception of its inhabitants as thoroughly passive. Not
only does the modern object lack speech, will, preference, intention or bias as arbitrary
shapeless matter, but as an inert body it always lacks the ability act, to effect change; and
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so it is something that is always acted on. In addition, due to the cleavage that separates
the world of Nature and worlds of society, an object is only defined with respect to
natural categories since the incommensurability of the two worlds prevents its effects on
the social world from being registered and impacting its initial definition. Coupling this
with immutability and necessity of the laws of nature, an object has a well-defined,
atemporal, ahistorical essence. Furthermore, the essence of an object, its substance, is
defined by the inherent properties that the object in itself possesses as a discrete entity.
The discreteness, self-constituting essence, and fixity give objects clear boundaries.
Contrary to Nature, with eternal laws which determine the course of passive
objects in advance, society is a contingent realm of existence. Its historical unfolding
depends not only on the preceding labor and passion of humans but also on the current
social movements at large as well the interests, thoughts, actions, and aspirations of its
constituent individuals. Although there are still forces that exist between its members,
social forces such as cultural values and beliefs, economics, social structure, bureaucracy,
government are not conceived as absolutes that deterministically dictate the everyday life
of individuals or human history, rather they are influences that shape, but do not control,
and are themselves subject to change. Along with this looser and more open relation
comes a shift in attention. When it came to understanding the domain of Nature the
universal laws alone are of central importance as they govern how all the particular
objects play out, with regards to society however the emphasis is also on the individual.
While humans are also substantively conceived as discrete beings, they have opposite
characteristics. To begin with humans are independent, autonomous, free, being forever
irreducible to the constraints of nature. Consciousness allows for intentionality, choice,
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reflexivity, and will which makes humans into subjects, granting them the ability to act
on others, including nature, themselves, and society as a whole, and effect change. As
such the human self is thought to be an independent and autonomous individual.3 Overall,
this ability to change over time gives individual humans and society the quality of
becoming while Nature is reduced to merely the quantities of being.4
Due to modernity’s metaphysics, in which Nature and society are fundamentally
separate spheres of existence from the start, the involvement and mixing together of
things and humans was perceived as mere confusion on the part of ignorant, primitive,
and unrefined humans. As such, modern progress is marked by the continual sorting of
the world into its proper category. Through the reductionist method of purification the
moderns gained an ever greater understanding of what truly is nature and what truly is
society as well as the separation between them. In the words of Latour, “Modernization
consists in continually exiting from an obscure age that mingled the needs of society with
scientific truth, in order to enter into an age that will finally distinguish clearly what
belongs to atemporal nature and what comes from humans, what depends on things and
what belongs to signs” (We Have Never Been Modern 71). One such leap forward that
modernity really comes into full effect is with the age of Enlightenment. With the
burgeoning of the natural sciences that reached farther expanses of the world with
unprecedented precision came a definitive demarcation of Nature that discredited many

3

Such a conception of the self leads to empathizing caring for people as discrete individuals and protecting
their freedom from being infringed on by other people, government, and the private sector of the economy.
4
This modern conception of the world, specifically of Nature and oppositional object and subject, is
supported by Martin Heidegger’s discussion on modern understanding of technology. In The Question
Concerning Technology Heidegger argues that the essence of modern technology is a particular
understanding of the natural world that reveals it in terms of human use value as a stockpile of energy, a
resource; and reveals nature as a whole as a coherent, quantifiable, discrete, and calculable system of
forces. This point of view in turn reveals humans as the users and places us in a mentality of max and min
and directs us to use and manipulate nature according to individual human ends.

8
previous ill-founded human prejudices, fantasy, religious import, superstitions, and
cultural beliefs. Such advances in Science have come to define an irreversible arrow of
time for modernity, one that moves towards an ever greater separation between Nature
and society.
While modernity is built upon this purified surface of separation between society
and Nature, Latour claims that its very success, e.g. its scientific discoveries,
technological inventions, and social movements, comes from the process of mediation
that exists unofficially below the surface of modern reality. These processes, including
those found in very practice of science itself, give rise to hybrid entities in which nature
and culture are fused in a type of synergetic phenomenon. While moderns utilize and
mobilize these mediating hybrids in everyday activities, such as in laboratory
experiments, their existence is not officially recognized by the modern constitution.5 This
is because, as Latour stresses, “The essential point of this modern constitution is that it
renders the work of mediation that assembles hybrids invisible, unthinkable,
unrepresentable” (34). The point is apparent from the above discussion since modernity’s
dualistic depiction of Nature and society is unable to grasp and represent such hybrids as
these would involve a mixing of mutually exclusive categories that are supposed to be
absolutely separate as self-contained, closed sets. In order to avoid the hypocrisy of
saying one thing and doing another, modernity tries to explain hybrids away by relegating
them to mere intermediaries, reducible mixtures of nature and culture.

5

The inability of the modern constitution to be able to register hybrids is not seen as a weakness but a
strength. There is just too much at stake, both politically and ideologically, to come to terms with hybrids.
In particular, politically, if science was seen as a hybrid practice that was contaminated by humans and
social interest then it would have to forfeit its claim to being absolutely objective; for more on this see
Politics of Nature. Ideologically, or with respect to how humans view themselves, this recognition of
humans and society as hybrids would challenge the cherished view that humans are completely unique
creatures that occupy a separate, special, sphere of existence that is detached from the rest of nature.
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Modernity manages to simultaneously specify and cancel out the work of
mediation that gives rise to hybrids, to so to speak have their cake and eat it too, “By
conceiving every hybrid as a mixture of two pure forms” (78). The existence of hybrids is
emptied of any relevance, or significance by conceiving them merely as mixtures that can
be split apart and reduced to their constituent natural and cultural parts, that is what
comes from the subject or the social and what comes from the object or Nature. In and of
themselves hybrids lack substance, their only claim to reality is through the pure essences
they are composed of. For instance, in the case of Boyle and the air-pump, the ontological
originality of the vacuum is rendered null and void by conceiving it as merely
representing part laws of nature and part 17th century English society; in particular, the
“…laboratory pump ‘reveals’ or ‘represents’ or ‘materializes’ or ‘allows us to grasp’ the
Laws of Nature…similarly, that the wealthy English gentlemen’s ‘representations’ made
it possible to ‘interpret’ air pressure and to ‘accept’ the existence of the vacuum” (80). As
such, hybrids do not need to be reckoned with as they can just be explained away in terms
of the given metaphysical picture of modernity; thus, leaving the modern metaphysics
intact.
Modernity is able to maintain that hybrids are just mixtures of the two pure forms
because it conceptually cancels out and historically conceals the work of mediation. The
work of mediation is canceled out by conceiving of such things as air pump, experimental
procedure, and the scientific theory as merely intermediaries between humans and
nonhumans. As an intermediary “…their role is precisely to establish the link between the
two but they establish links only because they themselves lack any ontological status.
They merely transport, convey, transfer the power of the only two beings that are real,
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Nature and Society” (80). The air pump, experiment, theory, and scientist are merely
neutral, unbiased conduits or vessels that allow for the manifestation of natural
phenomenon without imparting any of their own nature, so as to mediate, alter, or
structure the presentation of Nature. They simply reveal Nature as is, unadulterated by
human factors. Or in the case Hobbes and the Leviathan, the republic is just a reflection
of the will of the people, which is merely an amalgamation of social interest that contains
no traces of nature. Consequently, the purity of the two forms of Nature and society is
conserved as nothing is lost or added through an intermediary.
The key to pulling off this cancellation via intermediaries is to conceal, make
invisible, the actual processes that go into them, such as those involved in the practice of
Science and the unfolding of society. This time by writing off the process itself as a mere
intermediary, modernity manages to present mediating hybrids, themselves the product of
the work of mediation as hybrids of nature and culture, as mere intermediaries. As such,
the sole focus is on the givens and the results. Take for instance the story of the
Leviathan, the republic that results via the social contract represents only the interest of
fully formed humans and social factors as these are the initial given conditions. However,
this is because the story behind them is bracketed off, like how an individual’s interest is
shaped in part by their physical need and vulnerability which naturally arise as a result of
being material bodies or how the natural environment and its resources impact social
factors. With regards to science, by overlooking the actual practice of science and
focusing on just the end results, including already constructed scientific equipment and
established scientific discoveries and theory, it is able to mask the ways in which the
equipment, the experimental method and design, and the scientist are themselves
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mediated hybrids, that in turn mediate the proceedings of the experiment, the data, and
the ultimate findings and conclusions. Latour develops this saying,
If you suppress Boyle and Hobbes and their disputes, if you eliminate the work of
constructing the pump, the domestication of colleagues, the invention of a
crossed-out God, the restoration of English Royalty, how are you going to account
for Boyle’s discovery? The air’s spring comes from nowhere. It emerges fully
armed. In order to explain what becomes a great mystery, you are going to have to
construct an image of time that is adapted to this miraculous emergence of new
things that have always been there, and to human fabrications that no human has
ever made. The idea of radical revolution is the only solution the moderns have
imagined to explain the emergence of the hybrids that their Constitution
simultaneously forbids and allows, and in order to avoid another monster: the
notion that things themselves have a history (70).
In order to try and account for the emergence of fully formed hybrids out of thin
air modernity conceives of its history as one punctuated by radical revolutions, whether
they be scientific, intellectual, or social. Such revolutions are the dawning of a new age
that is completely detached from the previous ones. “The moderns have a peculiar
propensity for understanding time,” Latour says, “that passes as if it were really
abolishing the past. They all take themselves for Attila, in whose footsteps no grass
grows back. They do not feel that they are removed from the Middle Ages by a certain
number of centuries, but that they are separated by Copernican revolutions,
epistemological breaks, epistemic ruptures so radical that nothing of that past survives in
them” (68-69). With these revolutions, breaks, and ruptures come new and different
actors and a new sense of reality, e.g. the exact composition and structure of Nature and
society – the things that are said to exist, the theories that are true. While these were
formed over time through mental and physical exertion, this was in a past infinitely
removed from the present by revolutions that sever these historical origins. These new
fully formed actors are taken as the starting ingredients, the givens, which have always
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been like that since after all they reflect what reality really is. Consequently, their history
no longer becomes a problem, or for that matter, a question.
The historical perspective of irreversible revolutions and ruptures relies on a
bread-slice model of temporality. Temporality is defined by the particular operative
conceptual scheme used to organize the world. 6 “It is the sorting that makes the time,”
Latour asserts “not the times that make the sorting” (76). As such, one age seems to be
infinitely removed from the preceding age, even though it is only years, decades, or
centuries apart, because of the drastically different composition and organization of the
world before and after the revolution. The ruptures between times is due to the Attila-like
conception of time in which the present is like a slice of bread - everything that defines
the present is contained to only this time and has no connection to the ones preceding it.
In other words, the present day world represents a complete, ordered cohort of elements
that belong to same contemporary time period or calendar date. According to Latour’s
analysis, the systematic cohesion of this temporal front that is achieved by replacing
some of the elements of the preceding period with new ones and their rearrangement
gives rise to the impression of time passing irreversibly.7 However, it is not as if this
coherent and ordered front already naturally existed somewhere out there in the world
and we just had to discover it. Rather there is a bunch of tinkering that must be done to
arrive as this point where things fit neatly into place, which modernity fails to officially
acknowledge. In his words, “Modern temporality is the result of a retraining imposed on
6

For instance, before the age of Enlightenment the world was still understood from a religious perspective,
which is very different from the way the world was view afterwards through the lens of science, new actors
come on to scene such as scientific facts associated with a multitude of new natural objects and the
happenings of the world come to be explained through natural processes via laws of nature and scientific
theories.
7
Since it seems like all of a sudden there is this entirely new conceptual understanding – a new world - due
to the new elements and the changing places of the former ones, which is completely different as the past
one was proven to be wrong and this one is now the right one.
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entities which would pertain to all sorts of times and possess all sorts of ontological
statuses without this harsh disciplining” (72). This process of cleaning up, shaving off,
and severing the tangle of associations things have with the past and both ontological
domains, as well as the act of sweeping it under the rug, is crucial for modernity to
remain credible.
While the reductionism of modernity’s process of purification, and its dualistic
constitutional basis, proved to be an extremely effective analytic tool of understanding,
which led to numerous scientific and technological advances, Latour contends these very
advancements led to its unraveling. In his words, “…the moderns have been victims of
their own success…the scope of mobilization of collectives ended up multiplying hybrids
to such an extent that the constitutional framework which both denies and permits their
existence could no longer keep them in place…The third estate ends up being too
numerous to feel that it is faithfully represented either by the order of objects or by the
order of subjects” (49). The growing scientific fields and overall the ever-expanding
scientific front introduced a plethora of hybrids such as inertial guidance systems of
intercontinental nuclear missiles, fuel cell electrodes, anthrax bacterium, brain peptides,
asbestos, and global warming. These hybrids are not either wholly human or natural
creations, nor are they simply reducible to pure constituent essences. They are not thingsin-themselves, but are tied to the social collective. Latour brings this to light in asking,
“But where are we to classify the ozone hole story, or global warming, or deforestation?
Where are we to put these hybrids? Are they human? Human because they are our work.
Are they natural? Natural because they are not our doing. Are they local or global?
Both.” (50). However, modernity is unable to provide such an explanation due to its
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dualistic constitution. Unable to adequately account for such hybrids the age of
modernity essentially falls into shambles due to the ineptness of its sorting schema to
provide a coherent and complete understanding of the world; after all, it is the sorting that
makes the times, and so if the sorting schema falls into disarray so does the age itself.
The modern façade could have gone on a little while longer Latour says, “… if its
very development had not established a short circuit between Nature on the one hand and
human masses on the other” (50). The façade was able to hold water because Nature
seemed forever remote, transcendent, inexhaustible, and under control. However, this is
punctured with and like the increasing prevalence of such hybrid phenomena as the hole
in the ozone that it helped produce. The increasing pervasiveness, complexity, and
riskiness of these hybrids are linked to the constitutional basis behind their development.
The same constitutional guarantees that forbid their conception and deny the full-blown
existence of hybrids, he contends, paradoxically spur their proliferation as, “…the more
we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their interbreeding
becomes…” (12). Taking the absolute separation held between humans and nonhumans
for granted modernity carelessly carried on with scientific research and social practices
without concern about the impact that these two spheres of existence have on one
another. Consequently, modernity unwittingly mixed together, and linked, the two worlds
in ever greater ways, giving rise to such hybrids as the hole in the ozone and global
warming. These hybrid phenomena testify to the causal interdependency between nature
and society, which modernity guaranteed did not exist. Thus, similar to the failing
assessment of any other constitutional organization, modernity’s is due to its guarantees
not holding up.
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Chapter 2: Becoming What We Never Ceased to Be: Non-modern
Given the conceptual problems of Modernity’s dualistic constitution to adequately
account for the world, as well as the dangers its way of thinking cultivates, Latour
advocates the adoption of a non-modern perspective.8 “A nonmodern,” he describes, “is
anyone who takes simultaneously into account the moderns’ Constitution and the
population of hybrids that that Constitution rejects and allows to proliferate” (47). While
non-modernity is substantially different from modernity, jettisoning its dualistic essencebased categories of Nature and culture, it is not a complete rejection of modernity. Rather
it seeks to reconcile the modern Constitution with modern practices. Indeed in actuality,
Latour’s main contention in We Have Never Been Modern is that we have never really
ceased to be non-modern since in practice even the supposedly most purified disciplines
of science and politics regularly involve the mobilization and production of hybrids,
despite the modern Constitution claiming otherwise. In order to induce this change in
times and become non-modern,9 Latour introduces a hybrid ontology that is based on the
processes and practices that hybrids play a role in and from which they initially arise. In
doing so he adds depth to modern picture. While retaining the work of purification as an
analytical tool of understanding, Latour wants to elucidate the original nature of
mediation that is also going on in practice. Out of the work of mediation emerge hybrids
and nature-culture collectives, which respectively replace modernity’s dualisms of
subject/object and Nature/culture. Ultimately, Latour is just revealing the same world, as

8

However, he is not advocating a reactionary romantic movement that adopts anti-modern ideals or ways.
Nor should this be taken in the revolutionary sense as this would just buy back into the modern regime’s
conception of time with its ruptures and breaks from the past that allowed for the seemingly emergence of
new entities.
9
Recall it is the sorting that makes the time, so in changing the organizational categories used to sort world,
via a new ontology, Latour is essentially ushering in a new age.
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it has always been: an ontological continuum of hybrids, which vary in degree in their
particular mixture of nature and culture.
The moderns neglected to pay attention and due diligence to hybrids because of
their dismissal of hybrids and the practices which mobilize them and from which they
emerge as unimportant, unsubstantial intermediaries. By studying the real-life practices
of the so called moderns Latour seeks to reveal and bring to the fore the existence of a
plethora of hybrids and the process of mediation taking place/happening that gives rise to
them. Both of which have existed in the practices of the moderns the whole time but
behind the officially recognized scenes of modernity. In order to accommodate and
conceptually ground hybrids, the exceptions that prove to be the rule, Latour asserts, “To
the practice of purification – the horizontal line – we need to add the practices of
mediation – the vertical line…By deploying both dimensions at once, we may be able to
accommodate the hybrids, and give them a place, a name, a home, a philosophy, an
ontology, and I hope, a new constitution” (50-51). Hence, Latour is not rejecting
modernity and its analytical method of purification but rather is contending that there has
always been more going in the practices of modernity, i.e. the work of mediation, which
he wants to come to terms with. In doing so, he reveals the way in which moderns have
actively engaged in the production and use of hybrids.
The central practice of non-modernity, mediation, in turn calls attention to the
existence of things as mediators. While intermediaries merely serve a transitory role
between Nature and Culture, “A mediator, however, is an original event that creates what
it translates as well as the entities between which it plays the mediating role” (78). Unlike
an intermediary, which gives direct access to some thing already there, as is, mediation is
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an “original event that creates what it translates” in that the translation depends on the
method and actual process involved in the practice of a discipline as well as the members
participating on both sides and relationship between them. The translation process does
something: it creates something new by shaping, no matter how subtle or seemingly
inconsequential, the thing being translated. More specifically, translation can be seen as
the “…the process of constructing hybrid networks of relations, that is, bringing, together
supposed natural and social elements in a single phenomenon or practice (Bannon 21).
Translation creates a link that did not exist before between natural networks pertaining to
the physical system and cultural networks of humans. The resulting hybrid is a
manifestation of the overlap between these networks of relations. As such one of the
defining characteristics of hybrids is that they consist of a particular mixture of cultural
and natural parts.10 Again, the resulting hybrid is an original event – a synergetic
phenomenon – a sum which is more than its parts, and so is not reducible to either just
purely nature or culture, nor for that matter a combination of the two.
Ultimately, all phenomenon are mediated and so instead of being surrounded by
subjects and objects in natural and cultural environments, we find ourselves living in a
thoroughly hybrid world.11 Even paragon practices of modernity turn out to involve
processes of translation such that they too result in hybrid varieties.12 Take for example
the very modern practices of science and engineers which seem to be instances that fit
10

While Latour in the works mentioned in this paper conceives of hybrids mainly a being part nature, part
culture, i.e. part nonhuman part human, the concept of hybrid seems to be extendable to any overlap of
solely natural networks of relations, e.g. between an animal and its environment which would be an overlap
of internal relations constitutive of that animal and external relations constitutive of its surrounding
physical environment.
11
Simply put everything is a hybrid. Even the relata, i.e. humans and nature, of the hybrid relation are
hybrids.
12
Even the work of purification Latour contends is just a particular case of mediation (We Have Never
Been Modern 78-79). That is, the analytic method of modernity mediates reality by breaking it into simpler
parts.
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neatly into the pure, polar categorical urns of modernity – the scientific discoveries of
objective facts represents external objects of nature, while constructions of engineers
reflects the free self-assertion, creativity, and intentionality of agency associated with
subjects of society. However, examining the actual practice of these disciplines reveals
the work of mediation involved in each such that both scientific facts and constructions of
engineers are hybrids. These examples are also insightful because they show how
mediation occurs from both ends of the ontological spectrum; that is, the way in which
humans are mediated by nonhumans, e.g. in the case of the engineer, and nonhumans are
mediated by humans, e.g. in the case of scientific facts. Hence, not all hybrids are the
same but consist of different mixtures of nature and culture.
In making the practice of science, involving humans, experimental equipment,
and theory, of central importance Latour reveals the way scientific facts are mediated and
are themselves hybrids too. Rather than being merely an intermediary, experimental
research turns out to be a multi-layered process of mediation. From the collection of data
in field work in which an experimental procedure and scientific equipment translate a
living, breathing, changing, dynamic nature into the form of raw data.13 To the way the
data produced in a laboratory is an artificial representation of nature that was created by
isolating phenomena in a controlled setting through human stimulation via laboratory
equipment; and so, is only a simulation, albeit a very precise and reliable one. Then there
is the salient role theory plays in the practice. Observation, measurement, and
experimentation are simply not possible in a meaningful sense without a relevant
theoretical framework from which to interpret them. Data is interpreted and analyzed in

13

For more information on this process, specifically in the case of scientific field work, see chapter one of
Latour’s Pandora’s Hope.
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terms of the conceptual framework of scientific theory, which imports mental constructs
such as quantum mechanic operators, ideal conditions, and self-identity principles that
lack any correspondence to nature. All of which reflect the varying ways in which
“nature” is not conveyed in its totality but rather is the outcome of a series of translation
processes via experimental and theoretical practice through which some aspects are lost
while others emphasized. These translations reflect the structure of the networks involved
and what they are able to transmit; in the case of science, specifically a quantifiable
representation of the nature. 14 Moreover, this also goes to show the active role humans
play throughout the process of science and the formative impact they have on “nature.”
Nobel winning chemist Ilya Priogogine and Isabelle Stengers nicely capture this turn in
science’s understanding of itself: “Whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only
through the active construction in which we participate” (293).15 Therefore, even
“nature” is a hybrid as our most basic conception of it is entangled with humans via
scientific theory and practice.
While scientific facts illustrate how human artifices and practices have a
formative impact on “nature”, on the other side of the ontological spectrum there exist
hybrids that bear witness to the ways nonhumans/nature mediate human projects and

14

There is also the larger social/culture context that scientific research is taking place in, which itself
translates the practice and the development of science as a whole, and ultimately our representation of
nature. From the training and indoctrination of scientist, which directs them towards “questions of
interest,” accepting axiomatic beliefs and how to interpret nature, how to conduct experiments selecting
some factors as relevant and others not. Then there is the way facts are the end result of the consensus
formed by the respective scientific community on how to interpret the data, how the discoverer is engaged
in his field and in the particular experiments they are engaged in because of personal motivations (political,
moral, social, etc.) and how both the scientific community and the scientist is situated in a politically and
culturally charged atmosphere that direct scientific research towards various ends, which in turn reveals a
particular aspects of nature in a particular light.
15
The active role humans play in experiments has been most pronounced by quantum mechanics, e.g. the
double slit experiment, which has revealed the inescapability of perspective; challenging, the classical
scientific ideal of objectivity which is suppose to give a complete description of nature independent of how
it is observed.
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actions. Take for example the work of artist and engineers. Their work is often
envisioned as exemplars of modernity’s social category as they supposedly involve a
free, self-determined assertion of human will in which ideas are expressed through
useless, malleable, shapeless, and passive material. However, closer examination of the
actual process and practice of these disciplines again reveals there to be more going on
than meets the eye. Engineers and artist must work within the demands and confines of
natural materials. As such these natural networks mediate the projects, directing them to a
certain extent, opening some possibilities while closing off others, and ultimately are
incorporated in the final product. Great artist and engineers possess a familiarity and
intimacy with the character of materials, e.g. their physical properties, and how they work
such that they can know which is best suited and the best way to use them in order to
carry out their intentional design. The end product is not purely a human creation, the
culmination of some great act of domination of the will over the materials. Rather their
work represents a resonance between human intention and the materials, in which each is
expressed. While these constructions are mainly reflective of humans, the point is that
natural, physical materials play a part, have some say in it, and so they also have
nonhuman elements. In other words, they too are a hybrid network of relations.
Not only is a mediator an original event in that it “creates what it translates,”
giving rise to hybrids, but as Latour’s definition goes on to specify it also creates the “the
entities between which it plays the mediating role”. Out from this second aspect of
mediation derives his replacement for modernity’s dualism of Nature and culture.
Ultimately, Latour contends that the mediators, such as the air-pump as well as the
practices they are caught up in, existing between nature and humans/society come to
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redefine these very categories. Nature and culture are no longer either conceptually or
casually separate, rather they are co-constituted and connected via practices and networks
of hybrids as a nature-culture collective. The two form together out from and around the
practices of mediation such that they are relationally defined with respect to each other.
However, as a preliminary it should be noted that he is not completely jettisoning
the modern explanatory model. Rather he is saying that there is more to the story. While
modernity assumed that Nature and culture were givens, Latour’s emphasis on practice
seeks to elucidate the mediators, definitive events, and history that are behind and
constitutive of these categories. For modernity the pure forms of Nature and Culture
serve as the solid hooks of reality since what they are is more or less already given from
the beginning and remains relatively the same. As such they served as the foundation for
explanation in that phenomena are explained in terms of them by being reduced to either
the laws of Nature or principles of culture. However, by taking into account the
subterranean practices of mediation happening below the official scenes of modernity all
this changes: the explanatory model becomes inverted. Nature and culture have not
always existed, as is, from the outset and throughout. Rather Latour contends that they
change and are redefined over time with respect to the practices of mediation and the
resulting production of hybrids. It is only after the fact, after the original mediation
process and after the subsequent work of purification that the categories of Nature and
society take on more stabilized and distinct transcendent essences with the explanatory
power modernity granted them from the start. As Latour puts it, “The appearance of
explanation that Nature and Society provide come only late in the phase, when stabilized
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quasi-objects have become, after cleavage, objects of external reality on the one hand,
subjects of Society on the other.” (We Have Never Been Modern 94-95).
Thus, the submerged middle ground of mediating hybrids and translating
practices becomes the foundation of explanation for understanding the states of nature
and culture, as well as the changes therein. According to Latour, “The great masses of
Nature and Society can be compared to the cooled-down continents of plate tectonics. If
we want to understand their movement, we have to go down into those searing rifts where
the magma erupts and on the basis of this eruption are produced… Like the
geophysicians, we too have to go down and approach the places where the mixtures are
made that will become – but only much later – aspects of Nature or of Society” (87). He
refers to this shift from extremes to the downward center as a sort of Copernican counterrevolution, in that Nature/objects and Society/subjects are seen co-revolving around,
being mutually defined in relation to, the practices of mediation and the mobilized
collective of assembled hybrids. This rather abstract coproduction of Nature and Society
out from practice is insightfully illustrated by Latour in the case of the Boyle and the airpump:
All these questions are no longer caught between Nature and Society, since they
all redefine what Nature may be and what Society is...Around the work of the air
pump we witness the formation of a new Boyle, a new Nature, a new theology of
miracle, a new scholarly sociability, a new Society that will henceforth include
the vacuum, scholars, and the laboratory. History does something. Each entity is
an event. We shall no longer explain the innovation of the air pump by reaching
alternatively in the two urns of Nature and Society. On the contrary, we will refill
these, or at least modify their contents. (81).
Another move Latour makes away from modernity is his dismissal of the
separation of nature and culture – nature existing independently, as is and as it always has
been, on the one hand, while on the other we have cultures, which differ, change, as well
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as come and go. Instead a nature and a culture grow together, out of the practices of
mediation and in relation to the particular hybrids these practices give rise to, into what
Latour calls a nature-culture collective. A nature-culture collective is one in which the
two are causally connected and relationally defined with respect to each other. To begin
with, the collective itself represents a network of hybrids that connects the two states of
each. Natural processes and social practices have a way, via the networks of
interdependency between the two, of impacting each other. Nature and culture are not
only linked through causal networks, but much more fundamentally as the two are
conceptually defined in relation to each other. Latour maintains, “For each state of
Society there exists a corresponding state of Nature” (88). Put the other way around, a
particular understanding of nature gives rise to a particular type of culture in that the
society and its subjects think of themselves in certain light and engage with nature in
particular way. The specific way beings are divided up and the properties they are
attributed come to define the particular nature-culture collective.16 Latour elaborates this
and the way in which, “All natures-cultures are similar in that they simultaneously
construct humans, divinities and nonhumans…In constituting their collectives, some
mobilize ancestors, lions, fixed stars, and the coagulated blood of sacrifice; in
constructing ours, we mobilize genetics, zoology, cosmology, and haematology” (106).
One such example of this co-production is given by modernity itself. With the
invention of scientific matters of fact comes not only a particular stance with respect to
the realm of nature, e.g. what is nature and how it operates as well as through what and to

This connection is also brought to light by Heidegger elucidation of the Western world’s metaphysical
conception of Being and the way it gives rise to its particular worldview and understanding of humanity.
Also, Heidegger’s analysis of the understanding of modern technology points out how nature is revealed as
a stockpile resource which in turn positions man as the user and manipulator.
16
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who is it conveyed, but this stance in turn defines Western culture. The way in which
nature and culture change with respect to the practices of mediation and newly emerging
hybrids, e.g. new scientific facts, as well as how the two are also relationally co-defined,
is nicely illustrated by Latour in his portrayal of Boyle’s work and the new emerging
hybrid that is the scientific fact itself:
Boyle wondered how to put an end to civil wars. By compelling matter to be inert,
by asking God to not be directly present, by constructing a new closed space in a
container where the existence of the vacuum would become manifest, by
renouncing the condemnation of witnesses for their opinions. No ad hominem
accusation will prevail any longer, Boyle said; no human witness will be believed;
only nonhuman indicators and instruments observed by gentlemen will be
considered trustworthy. The stubborn accumulation of matter of fact will establish
the foundations of the pacified collective. This invention of facts is not, however,
a discovery of the things that are out there; it is an anthropological creation that
redistributes God, will, love, hatred and justice (83-84).
While it is worthwhile noting the way this quote places Boyle’s anthropological creation
and science as a whole in a larger social context, of particular interest here is the way
Boyle’s and science’s representation of nature via matters of fact redefines society,
giving rise to “modernity.” Specifically, it gives rise to the two world view in which
through their oppositional definitions the two reinforce each other such that science has
authority over the world of passive, inert matter that interacts via mechanistic forces and
necessity, while politics governs a world of intentional, passionate, free moral subjects.
Modernity, then, is just another nature-culture collective albeit one in which the relation
between society/humans and the scientific conception of nature is one of stark contrast,
the two having an oppositional definition.
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Chapter 3: Experimental Metaphysics and Quasi-objects
With his basic philosophical landscape surveyed we are now in the position to
delve deeper into Latour’s experimental metaphysics that presents hybrids as actants17 in,
and of, networks. Such a metaphysics is essentially an expansion of existentialism in the
sense that all hybrids, humans and nonhumans, are defined in relation to their effective
actions over the course of time. By their very definition, actants bring with them the
existence of other actants that register these effects and together form networks – another
main concept of Latour’s metaphysics. From this existential understanding of all hybrids
we come to terms with his organizational category of quasi-objects that refer to the more
natural, nonhuman side of the hybrid ontological spectrum. Quasi-objects are more
elevated things than the traditional objects of modernity in that they share properties
typically associated with humans such as an existential character, agency, and productive
power, although not to the same degree or form.
To begin with, the metaphysics Latour espouses is one of common sense. In order
for a thing to exist it must do something, have some effect, otherwise how would we
know it exists. The basic constituents of reality, anything real, are things that act – hybrid
actors. A hybrid actor is “…an association of humans and nonhumans, an association
[though] whose exact composition is not yet known to anyone, but about which a series
of trials makes it possible to say that its members act…” (Politics of Nature 75). The
trials come to define actors, as Latour lucidly explains, “Because there is no other way to

17

Note that actant and actor are pretty much used interchangeably. While actor is the much more common
term, it typically is used in reference to the human subject, but here on out should be thought of as applying
to both humans and nonhumans, which is what an actant does; hence its appeal and my use of it. Another
advantage of the term actant is that it can apply to a set of things or a subgroup, and so is not as restrictive
nor ideologically loaded as the terms like agent, which being embedded in the subject-object dichotomy of
modernity by default implicate individual things, objects and subjects, as the players on the scene as if this
was the way the world is naturally parsed, or so to speak carved at the joints.
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define an actor but through its action, and there is no other way to define an action but by
asking what other actors are modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character
that is the focus of attention” (Pandora’s Hope 122). Hence, the existence of a thing is
posited on, and defined with respect to, its effects on others.
This ultimately gets at the experimental nature of Latour’s metaphysics, which
extends an existential perspective to all things such that the existence of humans as well
as nonhumans is defined by their actions. He explicates, “What Sartre said of humans –
that their existence precedes their essence – has to be said of all the actants: of the air’s
spring as well as society, of matter as well as consciousness” (We Have Never Been
Modern 86). Again in making this move Latour is attempting to uncover the story, the
practices and processes, behind modernity’s concept of substance and essence.18
Specifically he is contesting the idea that the essence or substance of thing, taking the
form of inherent properties of the thing in itself, is atemporal: something that always has
existed and does not change. Rather what a thing is emerges through events, through the
trials it undergoes in the world or laboratory during which it demonstrates its mettle, the
resiliency of its action and effects on others. Originally, Latour contends, “The actor does
not yet have an essence. It is defined only as a list of effects – or performances – in a
laboratory. Only later does one deduce from these performances a competence, that is, a
substance that explains why the actor behaves as it does.” (Pandora’s Hope 308). That is,
an actor begins as just a name of action, a label corresponding to a set of effects. Based
on this set, the existence of an actor is then conjectured and eventually articulated a
substantive existence as a thing with such and such properties/powers that make it

In this regard, what Latour is doing is very similar to Nietzsche’s aim to reveal the origins, or at least
give a retelling, of the concepts of good and truth.
18
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capable of producing the respective set of effects.19 All things have this existential
definition such that what a thing is is defined by its effects in so much as it is instantiated
with various properties that correspond to those effects. This definition is then
subsequently read into the events themselves and used to explain the occurrence of such
effects as being caused by this actant. Existentially put, “A series of performances
precedes the definition of the competence that will later be made the sole cause of these
very performances” (119). His experimental metaphysics is thus epitomized by: essence
is existence and existence is action.
Pivotal to this move is the understanding of a scientific experiment as an event.20
Such an understanding dances between the traditional accounts of science given by
materialists and social constructivists, as either a discovery of nature out there or as
invention of scientific facts; both of which fail to capture the gravity of situation.21 Latour
brings this to our attention in his case study of Pasteur and the evention22 of yeast. Latour
elucidates this understanding, saying,
…an experiment is an event. No event can be accounted for by a list of the
elements that entered the situation before conclusion, before Pasteur launched his
experiment, before the yeast started to trigger the fermentation, before the
meeting of the Academy. If such a list were made, the actors on it would not be
19

From this perspective, scientists are not seen as merely discovering scientific facts out there. Rather they
take on more integral and productive role in the formation of facts in going from a collection of effects to
the articulation of a being with properties that would make it responsible for those effects.
20 Although here we are specifically referring to experiment, the world in general can be seen as a series of
events, in the much richer understanding of the word that is developed in this paragraph.
21
Latour continually stresses this point, and ever so more poignantly in the following: “Facts are
fabricated; we make facts, that is, there is a “fait-faire.” Of course the scientist does not make up facts –
who has ever made up anything?...I do not deny that people have minds – but the mind is not a worldcreating despot that makes up facts to suit its fancy. Thought is seized, modified, altered, possessed by
nonhumans, who, in their turn, given this opportunity by the scientists’ work, alter their trajectories,
destinies, histories” (Pandora’s Hope 282).
22
The term “evention” is original to this paper and not directly used by Latour, although his ideas spurred
its formation. Evention is meant to capture the understanding of scientific experiments, which gives rise to
new scientific facts, as events. The term is useful in describing the situation as such while not getting
trapped in the ideologically loaded words of discovery and invention that are bound up with the materialist
and social constructivist traditions.
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endowed with competence that they will acquire in the event…This list of inputs
does not have to be completed by drawing upon any stock of resources, since the
stock drawn upon before the experimental event is not the same as the one drawn
upon after it. This is precisely why an experiment is an event and not a
discovery…This is also why the list drawn up after the experiment needs no
addition of Nature or society, or whatever, since all the elements have been
partially transformed: a (partially) new Pasteur, a (partially) new yeast, and a
(partially) new Academy are all congratulating one another at its end. The
ingredients on the first list are insufficient, not because one factor has been
forgotten or because the list has not been carefully drawn, but because the actors
gain in their definitions through this event, through the very trials of the
experiment” (126).
Thus, the experiment as an event does something to, changes to some degree, the
participants involved. From the experiment nature emerges different. The experiment is a
happening in which the yeast rises to an occasion that is the challenge of the experiment,
which test its character. The experiment itself is designed by Pasteur as a trial for yeast to
show its mettle. This test specifically allows the possibilities for yeast to come to the fore
and demonstrate its effective abilities; and it is this regular performance that comes to
define what it is. Through the course of Pasteur’s experiment, “…it begins as a barely
visible entity and takes on more and more competences and attributes until it ends up as a
full-fledged substance” (PH 138). Before Pasteur the yeast was literally no-thing, just
some unimportant residual by-product of fermentation, but by the end the yeast comes to
be the central actor in the fermentation process, with its own independent autonomous
existence.
In addition to actants the other central concept of Latour’s metaphysics is
networks.23 Indeed, the concept of actant carries with it the concept of network. Since an

In fact, Latour’s metaphysics can be thought of as being primarily about networks, as nested sets of
hybrid networks, a network of networks, in that actants themselves are manifestations of the networks of
their internal parts. However, this is not to say the concept of actant is any way less significant since it
retains the experimental foundation of his metaphysics, as well as the central role it plays in sorting out the
world and parsing phenomenon in a meaningful way.
23
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actant is defined in relation to the sum of effects it has on others, its existence entails the
existence of other actants. These other actants and the web of relations between them
form networks and so actants are equally defined in relation to their surrounding
networks. More specifically, the particular effects it elicits is a reflection of the
relationship between its own internal network of constituent parts and that of the other
actants along with the surrounding network of relationships between them. Hence, it is
not as if external relations exist between prior existing things, but rather the relationships
between things become internalized in their definition such that it comes to constitute a
part of what the thing is, like the overlap of a Venn diagram. This in effect brings to the
fore another way things, qua actants, are hybrids. Due to the networks that bridge natureculture collectives the world of nature and culture are now, as they have always been,
casually connected. As such, actants are defined by the effects they have on nature and
nonhumans as well as culture and humans. For instance, nonhumans are no longer
defined by just their physical effects in the natural world but also by their effects on
humans.24 Thus, in the nonmodern age, the definitional understanding of a thing “…can
no longer be detached from the unexpected consequences that they may trigger in the
very long run, very far away, in an incommensurable world” (Politics of Nature 24).
The above quote also points to another way Latour is extending the existential
perspective: granting a history to all hybrids. Similarly to how we typically think of
humans, once a hybrid comes into existence as a full-fledged actor with some form of
thinghood it is not merely given by the context from which it formed, by its initial
effective definition. Rather a thing has the potential to change over time in an ongoing
In particular, Latour cites asbestos as one such example and how when it was first “discovered” it was
articulated in terms of physical effects on other natural things, but later this articulation came to include its
association with humans, namely its harmful effects, as well.
24
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process of redefinition. Thus what a thing is is the map that traces its trajectory
throughout its history of direct interactions and effects as well as its side effects. As such,
Latour claims that we should, “…view essences as events and trajectories” (We Have
Never Been Modern 87). The two dimensional space of non-modernity that Latour lays
out is designed to capture exactly this trajectory based essence. In particular, the vertical
dimension serves as “…a gradient that registers variations in the stability of entities
from event to essence” (85). It effectively monitors and tracks the degree of stabilization:
the progress of entities from their original event found in the work of mediation
throughout its historical development in particular practices and networks of purifications
that eventually refine it to its accepted essence. For example, in the case of Boyle he
contends that the air-pump does not have a given essence in-itself, which has always
existed and is either natural or social. Rather its essence is the outcome of the path it
traces through the collective network during the history of its existence. What the airpump is depends on the time it is being considered from. Are we referring to the airpump of 17th century, which is a newly created heated mixture and mediated event, or the
one that results after the work of purification as a stabilized essence in the 18th or 20th
century. Thus, things have history too, and this “History does something” (NBM 81).
While some hybrids, such as the vacuum, take more convergent paths toward a
stabilized essence via the work of purification, they all theoretically have the potential to
change more radically. In the course of their intermingling with others over time all
hybrids have the possibility to pursue more divergent lines, via ever more complex
mediation, and become something different. Unlike the being of objects that is fated to a
deterministic existence which is given and fixed from the outset and throughout, all
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hybrids have a becomingness about them in that they have an unknown potential and
“…are defined by lists of actions that are never complete…” (Politics of Nature 80). This
is because hybrids and mediation, for Latour, involve an element of surprise, uncertainty,
novelty, complicatedness, and unpredictability such that “…consequences always slightly
exceed their causes…” and an event “…cannot be exactly defined by its input and its
output…[it] always exceeds its condition” (82, Pandora’s Hope 307).
The view of the world as becoming instead of simply being is corroborated by
contemporary science’s understanding of networks. For instance, Prigogine and Stengers
point out in Order out of Chaos how network phenomenon such as feed-back loops,
resonance and interference effects, and non-linear causality25 in complex and far-fromequilibrium systems can produce emergent effects, instability and even bifurcation points
that can cause irreversible changes. They maintain, “In complex systems, both the
definition of entities and of the interactions among them can be modified by evolution”
(204). More specifically, small individual fluctuations can lead to the establishment of
new order through bifurcation regions such that “…an individual, an idea, or a new
behavior can upset the global state,” by exploiting “… to their advantage the nonlinear
relations guaranteeing the stability of the preceding regime” (206). Such an
understanding subverts the hegemonic order of nature put forth by modernity. Each
individual actant not matter how small or seemingly inconsequential has the potential to
redefine itself as well as the larger network it is apart of. Latour nicely expresses this,
25

By non-linear causality I mean the way in which due to the network of relations the sum of the effects of
actor A, e.g. society in case of global warming, along with that of actor B, e.g. nature, does not equal the
sum the their individual effects but rather the coupling of the system produces emergent effects due to
resonance or interference. In Vibrant Matter, a non – linear system is described as one in which by adding a
small cause to one that is already present this can induce dramatic effects such that effects resonate with
and against their causes such that impact/agency of an added element cannot be grasped at first glance but
is slowly brought to light as the assemblage stabilizes itself through mutual accommodations of its
heterogeneous components.

32
saying, “An infinitesimal cause can have vast effects; an insignificant actor becomes
central…A snail can block a dam; the Gulf Stream can turn up missing; a slag heap can
become a biological preserve; an earthworm can transform the land in the Amazon region
into concrete” (Politics of Nature 25).
The experimental metaphysical foundation of hybrids as actants in turn leads us to
his concept of quasi-objects. By defining all hybrids by their effects over time Latour
essentially grants a type of existential and historical dimension to all hybrids, turning
mere object into something more – a quasi-object. Like the modern counterpart, the
concept of quasi-objects is used to further articulate and sort the world. Quasi-objects
refer to the more natural, nonhuman side of the ontological spectrum of hybrids.
However, as the “quasi” prefix indicates these are not the clear-cut, discrete, polarized
objects of modernity. The hard and fast distinctions drawn between objects and subjects
as well as inside and outside, thing and environment, have become blurred with Latour’s
hybrid actant ontology. There are three main characteristics of quasi-objects that
differentiate them from the traditional concept of objects. First, as the discussion of
mediation first addressed, quasi-objects are hybrids in the sense that they are part nature
and part human, albeit much more natural than cultural. Next, drawing from his actantnetwork metaphysics is the way quasi-objects are fuzzy things. And finally I wish to
unpack how embedded in the concept of hybrids is also the idea that they simultaneously
share properties associated with objects and subjects. In particular, I will show the ways
in which quasi-objects have properties typically associated exclusively with humans. Not
only do they have an existential and historical character, but they also share a sense of
agency and meaning giving.
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As their name suggests, quasi-objects are no longer the pure objects of modernity,
existing out there, in the separate sphere of existence known as nature. Rather, as the nonmodernity section suggested, they emerge from the human practices of mediation
happening somewhere between and below the polar extremes of modernity. Latour
elaborates, saying, “Quasi-objects are much more social, much more fabricated, much
more collective than the ‘hard’ parts of nature, but they are in no way the arbitrary
receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other hand they are much more real,
nonhuman and objective than those shapeless screens on which society – for unknown
reasons – needed to be ‘projected’” (We Have Never Been Modern 55). Hence, quasiobjects retain a sense of the autonomy associated with traditional objects in that they have
their own voice, physical demands, which gives rise to and defines certain possibilities
independent of humans. At the same time, though, they are not wholly independent, in
the absolute sense of objectivity, since what they are is bound up with the practices and
conceptual framework they are articulated through; and so, in their very conception they
become integrated into our world having a human touch and point of reference.
Another characteristic of quasi-objects is that they are fuzzy. The conceptual
bracketing schema of modernity parsed the natural world into discrete entities with fixed
and given essences such that objects are presented in a smooth and clear-cut fashion. For
non-modernity this image changes due to the way quasi-objects qua actants are intimately
linked with various complex and dynamic network of associations. According to Latour,
there are “…no clear boundaries, no well-defined essence, no sharp separation between
their own hard kernel and their environment. It is because of this feature that they take on
aspect of tangled beings, forming rhizomes and networks…They have numerous
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connections, tentacles, pseudopods that link them in many different ways to other beings
as ill assured as themselves and that consequently no longer constitute another universe,
independent of the first…” (Politics of Nature 24). Lacking a clearly defined boundary
between where an entity ends and its natural and social environment begins, in addition
to the way they can evolve over time, conceptually what a thing is becomes uncertain and
fuzzy. Similar to the change in conception of electrons, entities go from being discrete
and delimited objects, like billiard balls, to resembling clouds lacking a definitively set
shape.
Moreover, quasi-objects share properties typically associated with human
subjects. They are not necessarily passive, inert, or fixed, but have a sense of agency in
that they are active and efficacious.26 Not only can they can change and adapt to given
circumstances but their actions can have a significant and decisive impact on events such
that they can change both the natural environment and social landscape. In Vibrant
Matter, Jane Bennett develops this line of thought that grants a form of agency to things
with her notion of “thing-power.” Blurring the dualistic categories of object and subject,
she defends that there is a certain vitality in nature, even in inanimate materials. Such a
vitality involves the “capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only
to impede, block the will and design of humans but also to act as quasi-agents/forces with
trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (Vibrant Matter viii). Unlike the
traditional object that is merely a source of resistance, a force of inertia, things are
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This extension of agency to nonhumans results from the distribution of agency amongst the actants
making up a particular network. For Latour, agency is not an inherent property of individuals but rather is a
network phenomenon. Jane Bennett puts this as follows: “…an actant never really acts alone. Its efficacy or
agency always depends on the collaboration, cooperation, or interactive interference of many bodies and
forces” (VM, 21). As such the efficacy associated with agency becomes distributed amongst a
heterogeneous field of actants, each with their own trajectories.
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productive agents that participate in events, helping to direct and shape the outcome.27
While not denying the impact of human intentionality, she is simply asserting that
humans have a less than definitive impact on events. Humans are not the only ones who
have a say in how events play out, rather things have, to various degrees, the “…power to
make a difference that calls for response” (32). And so, while nonhumans may lack a full
blown sense of agency associated with human intentionality, in which they reflectively
choose to act so as to realize their goal, they still retain the active power to effectively
make things happen and potentially alter the course of events according to their own
trajectory.
Finally, quasi-objects are more than mere objects because of the way they
constitute humans and culture. Contrary to the modern story which depicts objects as
being constructed and revolving around the human will as tools, in non-modernity the
reverse is true as well. That is, a certain type of human subject is seen arising out of and
revolving around particular quasi-objects. In this way quasi-objects act as a center of
gravity in that they attribute a particular sense of meaning by placing humans in certain
nonhuman frame of reference. In The Parasite, Michel Serres’s interpretation of a game
of soccer offers an illustration of this process of co-constitution that quasi-objects are
actively engaged in. He states,
A ball is not an ordinary object, for it is what it is only if a subject holds it. Over
there, on the ground, it is nothing; it is stupid; it has no meaning, no function, and
no value. Ball isn’t played alone…Let us consider the one who holds it. If he
makes it move around him, he is awkward, a bad player. The ball isn’t there for
the body; the exact contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject
moves around this sun. Skill with the ball is recognized in the player who follows
27

In this way nonhuman things have a vector nature to them, in the mathematical sense that involves a
force in a particular direction. Such a trajectory is the manifestation of the organization and constitution of
the thing’s internal network. This vector nature in turn causes humans and other nonhumans to interact with
them in particular ways.
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the ball and serves it instead of making it follow him and using it. It is the subject
of the body, subject of bodies, and like a subject of subjects. Playing is nothing
else but making oneself the attribute of the ball as a substance. The laws are
written for it, defined relative, and we bend to these laws (225-226).
From this we come to see how the object is in part fabricated in the social collective. That
is, the soccer ball is what it is in virtue of the game being played and its rules, which
allow for the players to interact and use it in particular way. The object-nature of the ball
is revealed in the way that as long as the players abide by the rules, they can manipulate it
according to their interest. Simultaneously, unlike a shapeless material that humans can
bend to whatever they will, the ball has its own objective autonomy and physics that the
players’ behavior must conform to. The ball makes demands, much like a subject, on the
players which they must take into account in order to first of all be players, but,
moreover, to be good players, their very being must bend around and incorporate these
into their play. The soccer players are ultimately defined in relation to the ball, amongst
other things. They would not be the same players in relation to another ball and in this
way the soccer ball grounds the being, the meaning, of what it is to be a soccer player.
Thus, the ball revolves around the collective and at the same time the players revolve
around the ball.
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Chapter 4: Quasi-subjectivity
Latour’s experimental metaphysics and concept of mediation ultimately leads to a
hybrid ontology involving a spectrum of actants ranging from quasi-object to quasisubject. The concepts of quasi-objects and quasi-subjects serve as the organizational
categories for non-modernity. Despite the significance of both of these terms in his
system of thought, the vast majority of his work seems to only discuss quasi-objects in
the form of nonhumans. Responding to this lack of discussion, I am interested in
understanding what it means to be human living in a non-modern hybrid world by
articulating the concept of quasi-subjects. Similar to what Pasteur’s work did for the yeast
and Latour’s work did for Pasteur’s drift through multiple ontologies, from attributes to a
substance, by connecting seemingly disparate ideas going on with Latour I hope to bring
to presence the conception of humans qua quasi-subjects in his work.28 At one point in
We Have Never Been Modern Latour too briefly acknowledges this lack, not only in his
work but throughout previous literature:
We possess hundreds of myths describing the way subjects (or the collective, or
intersubjectivity, or epistemes) construct the object…Yet we have nothing that
recounts the other aspect of the story: how objects construct the subject. Shapin
and Schaffer have access to thousands of archival pages on Boyle’s ideas, and
Hobbes’s, but nothing about the tacit practice of the air pump or on the dexterity it
required. The witnesses to this second half of history are constituted not by texts
or languages but by silent, brute remainders such as pumps, stones, and statues
(We Have Never Been Modern 82).
Proceeding from this description, my investigation into the nature of humans as quasisubjects seeks to specifically articulate the ways in which humans are conditioned and
co-constituted by material things. Like Latour’s move with the sciences, which sought to
As Latour describes the situation: “Despite the metaphor of “trails” implies, phenomena are not “out
there” waiting for a researcher to access them. Lactic acid ferment have to be made visible by Pasteur’s
work (just as Pasteur’s philosophical innovations has to be made visible by my work, since this was as
invisible before my intervention as the ferment was before his!)” (PH 139)
28
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unpack the sciences and reveal the behind the scenes history of human sweat and labor as
well as social interest that is bound up with the resultant scientific laws defining a field of
study, I want to reveal how nature, nonhumans, and material bodies do not merely
compose a background setting or serve as mere means, intermediaries, for human activity
and society. But rather, they are actively involved in shaping human experience and
subjectivity: what we can experience and the quality of those experiences, how we think
of ourselves, and our agency.
Before getting into the specifics, it is insightful to briefly sketch some essential
differences between the modern conception of humans as subjects and the non-modern
conception of humans as hybrid, quasi-subjects. Overall, the non-modern account is less
extreme and not solely individually and socially oriented. There is no hard and fast line
separating humans from nonhumans. As the prefix “quasi” connotes, humans are hybrids
too in that we share properties typically associated with objects, namely our physical
bodily being, and our sense of self and agency are co-constituted and mediated by
nonhumans. Humans just represent the more complex, multi-dimensional, end of the
scale of embodied beings having an existence marked by consciousness, temporality, and
meaning. Although we can develop a greater sense of self and agency, these are not
absolute or inherent features of human existence. Nor is the self seen as independent,
autonomous individual which is exclusively defined with respect to the cultural domain
such that who is a person is based on their own intentions, choices, and actions in relation
to a broader social context of meanings involving other people, norms, culture,
economics, government, and class. Rather, as will become clear in the proceeding
discussion, human identity and agency develops out from, depends on, and is defined in
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relation to others – nonhumans as well as humans.29 Ultimately, my work could also be
described as an attempt to make the phenomenological significance in Latour’s work
visible by showing the ways in which material bodies, nonhumans as well as our own, as
quasi-objects and mediators co-constitute human experience. In doing so, what it is to be
human qua quasi-subject is defined by the dialectical relationship between nature and
culture, inside and out. We are the synthesis, the linking together, of our own internal
networks of materiality and meaning with external networks of materiality and meaning.
With the concept of nature-culture collectives comes the understanding that a
particular state of nature and a particular state of culture emerge together out of various
practices of mediation such that the two are conceptually defined in relation to one
another and causally linked. Running with this non-modern understanding, I am
interested in how out from our practices and engagement with the world a certain type of
person emerges in relation to the type of nonhuman that also participates in these
practices. While not following up on it, Latour himself seems to be aware that human
practices not only have a reverberating impact on the state of nature and culture, but also
and more directly, reshape and to some degree change those involved, both human and
nonhuman. For instance, he asserts, “Nature will emerge altered from Boyle’s laboratory,
and so will English society; but Boyle and Hobbes will also change to the same degree”
(NBM 81). While he doesn’t explicitly explain the latter part of this claim, one way in
which Boyle and Hobbes both can be said to change is conceptually, in that through their
work we see them, and they see themselves, as humans qua subjects, which is understood
via the subject’s oppositional definition with respect to scientific objects and the modern
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Although, the focus on my work will be how humans quo quasi-subject are co-constituted by nonhumans
and material bodies since this is where I feel the novelty lies in my work, and originally in Latour’s.
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conception of Nature. Furthermore, the two can be said to change in the sense that they
and their work are viewed differently with the resulting schism between Nature and
culture that they usher in. Boyle and Hobbes now work in different practices with
different means of operation – Boyle in the world of Science and Hobbes in the world of
politics.
In the preceding section Serres’ example helped introduce this non-modern idea
that nonhumans no longer revolve around humans as a mere objects but rather humans
and nonhumans co-revolve around each other and the practices of which they are a part.
The process of co-constitution between humans and nonhumans is expressed in the field
of science studies via the concept of factishes. This concept describes the creation of new
actants, i.e. facts, through scientific experiments. For instance, how out from Boyle’s
laboratory and the air-pump there emerges the existence of a vacuum along with a new
Boyle. In her book, Cosmopolitics, Isabelle Stengers compares this process with the
process of reciprocal capture involved in the formation of symbiotic species. Reciprocal
capture is an event from which “a dual process of identity construction is produced:
regardless of the manner, and usually in ways that are completely different, identities that
coinvent one another each integrate a reference to the other for their own benefit”
(Cosmopolitics 36). Analogously, the fabrication of factishes connotes the way in which
new modes of existences emanate from eventful scientific experiments. For instance, in
her case study of the “discovery” of the neutrino, there is a coproduction of identities
between the physicist and the neutrino, each defining who and what the other is and does
within the larger scientific and natural context. In this regard their existence is
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intertwined such that “…the neutrino exists for physicists and, somewhat differently, the
physicists exist for the neutrino” (38).
Ultimately, the two help ground and co-constitute each other’s being. Physicists
are who they are in part because of the nature of the set of nonhumans that they study.
Neutrinos are what they are in part because of the type of scientist that studies them and
the particular conceptual theory and experimental procedure they are articulated through.
Put differently, the two would not be the same without each other. What a neutrino is
would not be the same without the physicists and their particular scientific frame of
reference involving both a theory laden with certain concepts and structure as well as
their particular institutionalized experimental methods and accepted findings.30 Nor
would the physicists be the same without the neutrino and the subatomic particle’s plane
of reference.31 The two simultaneously emerge as actors in relation to the systematic
organization of scientific practice with particular identifiable behaviors, modes of being;
that is, the way the neutrino interacts with other subatomic particles and the scientific
conduct of the scientist with respect to their interpretation of the experiment, how they
conduct the experiment and engage with the laboratory equipment.32

30

For example, the particular form of existence the neutrino takes is in part due to the surrounding theory
of particle physics as well as the physicist and laboratory which allows the neutrino become visible and
show its mettle.
31
The same can be said of the soccer player and the soccer ball each is defined by and oriented around the
other as well as the larger practice they participate in, namely the game of soccer which defines the rules of
their engagement and the context of meaning. What makes a person a soccer player is their playing with a
ball according to the rules of soccer. As Serres points out what makes a good soccer player in the
integration of the physics of the ball in relation to the rules and nature of the field into one’s thinking and
behavior as if it were second nature.
32
This co-constitution between human scientist and nonhuman natural is an ongoing process such that the
two go back and forth in defining each other in a spiral motion. Indeed, Serres elsewhere speaks of such
processes as Latour points out: ‘“I imagine, at the origin, a rapid whirlwhind in which the transcendental
constitution of the object by the subject would be nourished, as in return, by the symmetrical constitution of
the subject by the object, in crushing semicycles that are endlessly begun anew, returning to the origin…”’
(We Have Never Been Modern 84).
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Furthermore, since the sciences qua science must conform and map onto nature,
the practices of the sciences are especially apt to elucidate the very non-modern notion
that non-humans construct humans and shape subjectivity. More specifically, scientists
must go out of their way to try to see and think of the world in terms of nature and create
scientific experiments tailored to natural phenomena so as to create a stage suitable for
them to appear on their own.33 The construction and repetition of experiments itself
function as training exercises for the scientist involved. Latour describes this process,
saying “At the moment when the entity is at its weakest ontological status…shuffled
among clouds of chaotic sense data, the experimental chemist is in full activity, extracting
treating, filtering, dissolving, adding, sprinkling, raising the temperature, introducing
carbonic acids, fitting tubes, and so on” (Pandora’s Hope 131). Through the time and
effort the scientist expends in the laboratory, they come to gain an intimate experience
with the workings of the experiment: theoretically, the functioning of the laboratory
equipment, and the overall running of the experiment. This slowly but surely, if the
experiment is going to be a success, develops into a relationship between the two such
that the scientist’s subjectivity becomes oriented around the demands and needs of the
particular thing being studied. The scientist comes to think and respond according to their
equipment and the natural thing being studied.
Recall, for example, the scientific couple of Pasteur and yeast that Latour brings
to our attention and how Pasteur is described as emerging differently from the experiment
due the relationship he forms with the yeast. In order to understand the transformation of
Pasteur it is important to remember that the experiment is an event. It is a process that
tested Pasteur as a scientist the whole way, as much as it tested the yeast. From setting up
33

See Pandora’s Hope p.130.
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the experiment, involving the meticulous construction of the experiment as a stage
suitable for the yeast to give its performance, to consistently carrying it out time and time
again, to even the prior thought process that called into question the organic residue as
potentially being something more, each challenged his ingenuity and abilities as a
scientist. Over the course of the experiments and the experience he gains with the yeast
via the laboratory equipment and scientific theory he develops an intimacy with the yeast
that molds his being: his perception, dexterity, sensitivity, and thinking. He becomes
receptive to the subtle changes in the sample and the readings from his laboratory
apparatuses in such a way that they are meaningful to him as the indirect indications and
signs of the yeast itself, which in turn direct his thoughts and actions.34
The shaping of human subjectivity by nonhumans is not limited to the esoteric
events of the laboratory, but permeates human existence in general. Similar events
happen in the everyday world in which humans emerge differently as a result of the
intimate relationships they form with the particular nonhumans that play a meaningful
role in their life; for example the way technology like cellphones and social media shapes
our relationships with others, the way we respond to them, and how these effect how we
express and think of ourselves and the way we conduct our day. Or take for instance how
our natural setting plays an active, versus passive, role in shaping our sense of self. From
the weather’s immediate impact on our mood and disposition, shaping how we feel about
ourselves and our perception of the day, giving rise to a corresponding set of possible
activities we can, and want to, perform and inclining us to do them in a certain manner.
To the way geographical landscapes and climate contribute to different ways of life and
This is comparable to the way a lover’s identity is co-constituted by the one they care for. Their sense of
self becomes oriented around the other such that they identify with loved one’s perspective. They come to
relate and see the world in terms of the other as well as themselves.
34
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identities; e.g. the persona associated with south or the more laidback attitude of life by
the beach. Then there is the way that a person’s relation to particular material things coconstitutes their identity. Whether it be the type of vehicle a person drives, a Prius versus
an SUV, to the type of food they eat, from a vegetarian diet to red-blooded meat, each of
these serves as an objective extension of themselves that attests to their values, and how
they value themselves, and their larger world views.35 This last point gets at a larger point
that culture is not only conceptually defined in relation to the concept of nature, but is
also physically, as it is not only defined by the autonomous physicality of nature but also
defines itself through it. The particular meaning and values of a culture takes root and
hold of people by being physically grounded, that is instantiated in material bodies and
their configuration. 36 The idea that nonhumans serve to stabilize social order is captured
in the following line of questioning by Latour:
And if religion, arts or styles are to ‘reflect’, ‘reify’, ‘materializes’, ‘embody’
society…then are objects not, in the end, its co-producers? Is not society built
literally – not metaphorically – of gods, machines, sciences, arts, and styles?
Maybe the social sciences have simply forgotten that before projecting itself on to
things society has to be made, built, constructed? And out of what material could
it be built if not out of nonsocial, nonhuman resources? (We Have Never Been
Modern 54).37
While the co-constitution of human identity by nonhumans is a ubiquitous feature
of human existence in general, the non-modern, Western, self is specifically shaped in
relation to the large population and demography of nonhumans that is characteristic of

Such talk also brings to mind Marx’s analysis of labor as a means of self-affirmation. Through our labor
we create products that we identify with, in that, a part of our self is infused in, and represented, by them.
In the products of our labor we take on a more definite and objective extension. However, given our
nonmodern, hybrid ontology a necessary amendment to this would be that the creation is not a mere
reflection of human will but is part human part nature, an overlap of both human intentions and nonhuman
possibility.
36
One such example of this is racism in the South. The physical separation of facilities like bathrooms,
water fountains, and public transportation sough to reinforce the idea of racial separation and inferiority.
35
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our non-modern nature-culture collective. From scientific facts to technological objects,
the demography of the nonhuman population of non-modernity arises from the salient
role the sciences have played in it and continue to do so. As Latour puts it, “… the most
fundamental aspect of our culture, since Boyle’s day… [is that] we live in communities
whose social bond comes from objects fabricated in laboratories…” (21). Furthermore,
the exponential and unrestrained growth of the sciences and technology under the ruse of
modernity has multiplied hybrid nonhumans at an unprecedented rate and intermingled
nature and culture like never before. According to him, “The fact that one of the
collective needs ancestors and fixed stars while another one, more eccentric, needs genes
and quasars, is explained by the dimensions of the collective to be held together. A much
larger number of objects requires a much larger number of subjects. A much greater
degree of subjectivity requires a much greater degree of objectivity” (108). With
scientific advancement, and greater objectivity, came a more broad and nuanced
understanding of nature that came to be composed of more and more things, each of
which being articulated with more and more details and precision. In other words, the
expansion of the sciences led to the creation of new, and more refined, facets of the
world. From this greater and more precise understanding of nature we have come to
better understand our relation to the rest of nature, even seemingly disparate parts from
stars to bacteria. Furthermore, humans too are objects of scientific scrutiny, which has
given rise to psychological objects like ADHD and OCD that we are now defined in
terms of. It is this ever expanding and detailed web of connections between human and
nonhuman given to us by our scientific understanding of nonhumans around us as well as
humans that has given rise to our more acute and scientific articulation of the self. From
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the basic, individual self that was a source of action and bearer of responsibility, to one
that nowadays is described via personality traits, genetics, culture and mental states,
humans have taken on a greater degree of subjectivity.
Not only do nonhumans co-constitute our subjectivity in a relational sense, but
they also do so much more fundamentally by conditioning our agency. Challenging both
the modern understanding of freedom and action, this conditioning arises from the
conception of network agency. Rather than being absolute, the ability to do whatever we
want whenever we want, and possessed by the single individual emanating from their will
and inherent powers, action and freedom are realized in relation with other humans as
well as nonhumans.38 Jane Bennett expresses this succinctly, saying, “…an actant never
really acts alone. Its efficacy or agency always depends on the collaboration, cooperation,
or interactive interference of many bodies and forces” (Vibrant Matter 21). That is,
human projects and goals are never carried out alone but require the help and enlistment
of others to the cause. Action and freedoms manifest due to our association with others
through the overlap and alignment of human networks of possibility, meaning, and
intention, and nonhuman networks of possibility and directedness. Latour nicely captures
this, saying,
It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read “Man flies,” “Woman goes
into space.” Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that includes
airports and planes, launch pads, and ticket counters. B-52s do no fly, the U.S. Air
Force flies. Action is simply not a property of humans but an association of
actants…actants are in the process of exchanging competences, offering one
another new possibilities, new goals, new functions (Pandora’s Hope 182).

38

While this as well as the prior point made concerning identity is similar to a care ethicist view in which
our sense of self and action emanate from our relationships with others, the main difference is in the
expansion of the meaning of other so as to include nonhumans in addition to humans. Nonhumans have in
general been neglected throughout the history of philosophy which why there is a need to pay special
attention to them.
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By themselves, neither planes nor humans fly. It is only together, along with the greater
behind the scene collaborations such as between physics and engineering, that flying
through the air becomes possible, something we are free do.39
In this regard, the subject-object dichotomy of modernity can be seen as a
misleading way of thinking about the world, presenting a false dilemma that makes either
the subject or the object the bearer of possibility and power rather than the association
between them. Indeed, even Sartre’s conception of transcendence and immanence also
comes off as misleading in this light. While consciousness, and in effect detachment from
one’s self and the world, provides the possibility of choice and hence freedom, the actual
possibility of my being and assertion of my freedom is co-constituted by the nonhuman
and human givens of my situation. My openness towards the future although infinite in
theory, is always situated in the here and now, and so, amounts to re-envisioning and
artistically playing around with the possibilities of nonhumans and humans that make up
my situation. Thus, transcendence and immanence are not oppositional features defining
human existence. Transcendence, and the exercise of our freedom, is derived from our
downright immanence; after all, what is an artist without a medium?
Due to this network derived sense of agency in carrying out our projects we
naturally find ourselves engaged with others. However these others are not the
intermediaries of modernity, but the full-fledged mediators of non-modernity.
Consequently, humans lose the purity of Kantian autonomy as intentionality itself is
mediated by nonhumans such that we too become hybrid actors. In other words, with the
dawn of non-modernity we can no longer think of an individual as a mirror reflection of
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The non-modern self then has a greater degree of freedom, as well as subjectivity, due to the greater
number of nonhumans in the non-modern collective such as planes.

48
their willful intentions and values – their laws onto themselves. In order to understand the
shift in conception it is necessary to return to the idea that the self, like the sciences, is
founded in practice. Humans are not just defined by the ideas and plans in their head, but
also in the actual implementation of them, by their actions, which involves other
nonhumans. These enlisted others are not merely passive tools but participants in the
activity. In the process of working with them they effectively modify and redirect our
original intentions and how the action is carried out as our plan literally takes form.
As Latour describes it, the coupling of humans and nonhumans results in
modified programs of action for both of them. A program of action is “…the series of
goals and steps and intentions that an agent can describe in a story…” (178). He
illustrates this through an example involving a man and gun, each alone having their own
program of action – their respective goals or functions they seek to accomplish. When the
two come together they form a third, emergent agent, a gunman, with a new, original,
composite goal that does not correspond to either agent’s original program of action or a
mere summation of the two. Rather the third agent’s program of action is a translation of
the other two: a “…displacement, drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that
did not exist before and that to some degree modifies the original two” (178). While he is
not denying that there are cases of the NRA story in which people enlist a gun to help
carry out their premeditated plan to murder, or other cases of the materialist story which
give credence to the slogan “Guns kill people” where an otherwise innocent person is
seized by the script of the gun and is transformed into a criminal, he is contending that
more often than not this translation in programs of action occurs such that “You only

49
wanted to injure but, with a gun now in your hand, you want to kill” (178-179).40 Thus,
intentionality is not simply a pure reflection of the human agent, but the very formation
of intentions as well as the carrying out of them via actions is mediated by the nonhuman
actants that we have had previous experience with and the ones we find in our current
environment.
Furthermore, the mediation of intentionality alters the actants involved such they
are no longer the same as they were alone. Through the cooperation of their individual
agencies together they form a new agency, which emerges with new and different
possibilities. In light of Latour’s metaphysics, this coupling of action no longer
necessarily proceeds in a linear fashion. Rather the third agent is an emergent
phenomenon that reflects the particular network of relationships between the individual
actants and whose agency is more than the sum of its individual parts, which is to say the
individual agents’ directedness and capacities. As such Latour’s concept of translation
associates action with uncertainty and surprise. In carrying out one’s intention something
happens in the actual act due to this fusion of human and nonhuman agency such that we
are overcome and surprised by the outcome my action. Latour nicely elucidates this,
saying,

While Latour’s gunman is an example of the way our intentions are mediated by external nonhumans,
because the gun is a human construction its program of action is more artificial and so it could be contested
that the gunman’s intention is not a hybrid phenomenon but rather human action being mediated by further
humans. However, the gun itself is hybrid of the laws of physics, combustion, material configuration and
human design, and so there still is nonhuman component that is being integrated to human life. Or the same
problem could be resolved by replacing the gun with a rock. The rock opens up similar, new possibilities
for the angry, albeit weak, person with the intent to injure and directs the conduct of their action to a certain
extent. Together the two represent a new agent with new possibilities and a new character. In entering this
particular association, the rock changes what the person is via changing what they are capable of, i.e.
granting them the ability to hurt in a particular way and so making them intimidating, while the person
changes what the rock is, making it into a weapon. The engineering example of mediation in the second
section is another good example of the modification of human intentions by more natural nonhumans.
40
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The scientist makes the fact, but whenever we make something we are not in
command, we are slightly overtaken by the action: every builder knows
that…That which slightly overtakes us is also, because of our agency, because of
the clinamen of our action slightly overtaken, modified…But there are events. I
never act; I am always slightly surprised by what I do. That which acts through
me is also surprised by what I do, by the chance to mutate, to change, to bifurcate,
the chance that I and the circumstances surrounding me offer to that which has
been invited, recovered, welcomed (281).
Ultimately, this co-constitution of identity and agency by nonhumans comes
about due to the human condition of embodiment. Humans are thinking bodies. It is
because of our bodily comportment, specifically our outward openness that we are able to
develop identities at all.41 As such we are effectively and affectively dependent on both
the outside material world as well as our internal physical constitution. The coconstitution of the human self by material bodies is most tangibly and universally
expressed via our own bodies. The effect that the subject’s own physical constitution has
on consciousness is insightfully pointed out by Erwin Schrodinger: “Consciousness finds
itself intimately connected with, and dependent on, the physical state of a limited region
of matter, the body. (Consider the changes of mind during the development of the body,
as puberty, ageing, dotage, etc., or consider the effects of fever, intoxication, narcosis,
lesion of the brain and so on)” (88). While in Vibrant Matter Jane Bennett focuses on the
effect that external material stuff, i.e. food, has on the whole of our well being as humans.
Food is not only vital to our physical health but also constitutive of our mental states. She
contends that dietary fats, through a type of emergent causality, can effect human moods
and cognitive dispositions such that “…particular fats, acting in different ways in
different bodies, and with different intensities even within the same body at different
times, may produce patterns of effects, though not in ways that are fully predicable. This
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is because a small change in the eater-eaten complex may issue in a significant disruption
of its pattern or function” (Vibrant Matter 41-42). Here is another example of the agency
of nonhumans. Like other nonhuman actants, the agentic capacity of food “includes the
negative power to resist or obstruct human projects, but it also includes the more active
power to affect and create effects” (49). She also points out Nietzsche’s similar
assertions, which went so far as to say that not only our psychological and cognitive
states but also our aesthetic and moral complexions were altered and reformed by what is
ingested. All of which elucidates the hybrid nature of humans. We not only share the
naturalness of physicality as primordially material beings, but our physical and mental
states are interdependently tied and co-constituted by external material bodies.
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Chapter 5: Ethical Conclusions
In the traversal of the above discussion, we have come to grips with the myth of
modernity and come to terms with what we never have ceased to be, non-moderns.
Modernity divorces the world into the mutually exclusive and entire separate categories
of Nature/object and society/subject. As a whole, modernity discredits the existence of
hybrids and practices of mediation, dismissing them as mere intermediaries, and relies
solely on the practices of purification. While this reductionist method of analysis proves
to be very effective and leads to the success of modernity, in the form of scientific and
technological advances, ultimately this very success is its undoing. Such advances give
rise to a plethora of hybrids, ranging from the sciences themselves to dangerous ones like
global warming, that modernity’s conceptual schema is unable sort or simply dismiss;
and so, sends it into crisis. From there we traced the way non-modernity conceives of
practices of mediation as the foundation of reality, around which the categories of nature
and society are conceptually co-defined and causally connected, forming nature-culture
collectives. Due to mediation, the world at large is an ontological continuum of a hybrid
actants that vary in their degree of complexity42, ranging from quasi-object to quasisubject, as well as their constitution, ranging from mostly nonhuman to mostly human.
All of which though, qua actant, are relationally and existentially defined through their
various networks of associations with humans and nonhumans. Thus, the non-modern
ontology mixes together the traditional categories of nature/object and society/subject
such that hybrids share properties from both and represent part nonhuman part human;
which we first witnessed via Latour’s chief example of quasi-objects. With the Latourian
stage set, the question became how does this all this impact what it is to be human? In
42
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other words, using Latour’s organizational schema, what does it mean to be a human qua
quasi-subject? Given the felt lack of explicit discussion on such matters we then
embarked upon such a task. By connecting seemingly disparate topics within Latour’s
literature, from factiches to network agency to modified programs of action to
embodiment, the concept of quasi-subjectivity was articulated.43 Given the non-modern
conception of human existence, as one mediated by humans and nonhumans such that our
identity and agency is co-constituted in relation to them, the last thing that remains is to
start to chart the implications this has for ethics.
Working from a similar philosophical background, in The Enchantment of
Modern Life Jane Bennett is also interested in retelling the modern narrative so as to
reveal the ways in which enchantment still pervades life, and ultimately the role this
plays in ethics. At the outset of her work she asserts, “But what is at stake in such a
retelling? The answer for me has to with the effect – always indirect – that a cultural
narrative has on the ethical sensibility of its bearers” (The Enchantment of Modern Life,
12). In this vein, this section seeks to understand the shift in ethical orientation that
comes with the change from a modern to non-modern narrative. Given the emphasis on a
more expansive sense of existentialism and relational ontology, the ethical aim of nonmodernity should not be to provide a fixed, absolute, and universal set of moral principles
that apply to all people for every situation. Instead, like care ethics, the focus of such an
ethic will be on developing a virtuous character, meaning an internalized disposition such
that we relate, and in effect respond, to the specificity of our situation in an appropriate
way. However, this re-conception of ourselves as quasi-subjects that are relationally
With the thought in mind, “…existence is not an all-or-nothing property but a relative property…An
entity gains in reality if it is associated with many others that are viewed as collaborating with it. It loses in
reality if, on the contrary, it has to shed associates or collaborators (human and nonhuman)” (PH 158).
43
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constituted in ways even more expansive than previously thought entails a shift in not
only what virtues are central for a non-modern ethic but also in how ethical responsibility
is thought of. Rather than the modern virtues of self-sufficiency and purity of intention
associated with its conception of the self as being one of discrete and independent
selfhood, via the autonomous individual, authenticity and considerateness become the
central virtues of non-modernity. In addition, the retelling of agency via a metaphysics of
actants and networks that distributes agency throughout a network entails a redistribution
of ethical responsibility as well. Thus not only does the normative framework change but
also the associated standards, values, and sense of responsibility that we should hold
ourselves to and strive for, as well as, the way we ought to interact with other humans as
well as nonhumans.
In order to make good choices and effective actions, we must first acknowledge
our current situation – how who we are is defined in relation to those around us – as
choice, in the first place, is contingent on being conscientiously aware of my given
situation and the success of my future projects depends on having a realistic
understanding of who I am and what I am capable of in relation to the possibilities
afforded by others.44 Hence, given the shift in conception of what it means to be human,
the most central and vital virtue that needs to be stressed and dwelled upon, especially
due to how the modern mentality has become so engrained, is authenticity. Authenticity
is a particular relation to one’s self such that one can be said as being true or honest to
one’s self, meaning that who they are and who they take themselves to be coincide. The
non-modern conception of authenticity most closely resembles that put forth by Simone
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de Beauvoir in the The Ethics of Ambiguity. There authenticity amounts to assuming and
living consciously of the ambiguity of human existence, which refers to the simultaneity
of facticity and transcendence, matter and mind, finite and infinite, and inwardness and
bond with the world, as well as separation and interconnectedness. The way in which
these two poles of antinomy come together in lived experience, especially facticity and
transcendence, mind and matter, internal and external, is very similar to the way humans
and nonhumans as well as nature and culture, along with the particular possibilities and
meanings each opens up and closes off, co-constitute human existence. Putting
everything together, the virtue of authenticity for non-modernity amounts to avowing the
ambiguity of our existence, integrating this understanding into our sense of self and our
future projects, that is the simultaneity of a facticity which now also includes the way we
are hybrid beings co-constituted both within and without by nonhumans, and this new
sense of transcendence involving how intentionality and agency is also co-constituted
from networks of associations with humans and nonhumans. Ultimately, authenticity is
the most vital virtue for humans living in a hybrid world because of the way human
flourishing, in the form of health, happiness, and meaning, is dependent on it.
One aspect of this non-modern authenticity is coming to grips with the fact that
we are not self-constituted individuals. We can no longer think of ourselves as
completely self directed, with a given set of inherent powers. Human intention is
mediated by the directedness of autonomous nonhumans, while our capabilities and
freedom are co-constituted by the relationship between our internal and external networks
of associations with both humans and nonhumans. Thus, human agency and our sense of
self is thoroughly relational in that they are developed in relationships with others and
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rely on others for the formation and exercise of their capacities. While my thoughts on
how such a non-modern ethic would take shape are very aligned with and rooted in such
perspectives as that of Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics and feminist care ethics, what I
feel Latour’s understanding adds to the picture, which has been previously neglected
throughout much of philosophy and is why my position seeks to move beyond them, is in
this expanding notion of other so as to include networks of nonhuman hybrid actants.
Overall then, realizing this virtue of authenticity amounts to understanding the sources of
one’s sense of self and agency, and responding accordingly.
More specifically, humans, like all actants, are fuzzy beings that while appearing
to have a well-defined bodily boundary, who we are and what we are capable of is
dispersed throughout networks and time.45 As such, self-reflection is not simply a matter
of looking within, at say our inner psychological and emotive selves as well as other
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On the self being dispersed throughout space and time I mostly have in mind John Russon and the idea
that “As experiencers, then, we simply are synthetic process of imaginative interpretation” (14). As
synthesizing subjects we can recognize the togetherness of things in the form of unitary wholes or set
patterns between things. More importantly, with regards to the temporal dimension of our being, is the role
of imagination and the ability to think in terms of things that are not currently present (13). Human
existence is marked by temporality in that my present experience is laden with habits from the past, which
present themselves in the form meaningfully charged environments that carry with a directional force –
directing me to some end (16), and future projects, which literally project themselves onto my
interpretation of the present. He likens the way in which human experience of the present is temporally
laden to that of listening to music, in which, “The listener must come to inhabit the music, join with it in
anticipating its further development, and hear the notes that present themselves in the context of what has
already sounded” (12). One difference being that in addition to the way the present is temporally laden due
to the synthetic, imaginative subjects we are, the present is also temporally laden because of the nonhumans
that inhabit it which comes from kinds of different time periods. Although not touched on before, with nonmodernity comes a different understanding of time. Instead of history being divided by revolutionary
ruptures such that each period is contained, recognizable by the coherent cohort of entities that belong
specifically to that time, past historical periods have a way of persisting and even recurring such that a
given temporal frame consists of a mixture of diverse time periods. Latour elucidates on this saying, “I may
use an electric drill, but I also may use a hammer. The former is thirty-five years old, the latter hundreds of
thousands. Will you see me as a DIY expert ‘of contrasts’ because I mix up gestures from different times?
Would I be an ethnographic curiosity? On the contrary: show me an activity that is homogeneous from the
point of view of the modern time. Some of my genes are 500 million years old, others 3 million, others
100,000 years, and by habits range in age from a few days to several thousand years. As Peguy’s Clio, and
as Michel Serres repeats, ‘ we are exchangers and brewers of time’ (Serres and Latour, 1992). It is this
exchange that defines us, not the calendar or the flow that the moderns had constructed for us” (We Have
Never Been Modern 75).
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features of our internal bodily being, but, must also involve thinking of ourselves from
without. In Human Experience, John Russon follows a similar line of thought with
regards to outwardly looking form of self-reflection. In particular, he says, “Selfknowledge, that is, does not come through the easy reflection upon ourselves that we
typically rely upon, but, on the contrary, will only come through a study of the
determinate forms of interpretative synthesis that can be discerned within the character of
objective calls to action (“objective” in the sense of, “pertaining to the nature of the
object”): the terms in which we experience the object as calling upon us reflect the value
and projects through which we experience the world” (17). While Russon elucidates how
the way things appear to us is not as an independent discrete object but rather its very
unity of being in appearance automatically incorporates its relation to ourselves,46 what I
am trying to articulate is the opposite end of this relation. That is, how our sense of self
reflects our relationships to a larger nature-culture network, and in particular, the hybrid
nonhumans we personally are intimately familiar with that play a role in everyday
experiences, shaping our habits, and our comportment to the world. Therefore, learning
about ourselves involves looking around at the meaningful nonhumans (“meaningful” in
the sense that they contribute to what we take to be a meaningful life) in our life to see
what they say about us. Essentially, this move develops upon the self-affirmative sense of
identity that thinkers from Hegel to MacIntyre have put forth. As MacIntyre describes it,
“…self-knowledge too depends in key part upon what we learn about ourselves from
Specifically, Russon says, “…experience is always interpretative: whatever perception we have of the
world is shaped by our efforts to organize and integrate all of the dimension of our experience into a
coherent whole. How we go about this will be dictated by the level of our education, by our expectations,
by our desires, and so the vision we have will always be as much a reflection of ourselves and our
prejudices as its is a discovery of “how things really are.” In other words, the very way that we see things
reveals secrets about us: what we see reveals what we are looking for, what we are interested in. This is as
true of our vision of things we take to be outside us as it is of our vision of ourselves” (10).
46
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others, and more than this, upon a confirmation of our own judgments about ourselves by
others who know us well, a confirmation that only such others can provide” (94). The
difference being that this criterion grounded ascription of identity by others includes
nonhumans as well as humans. In this way, our sense of self is intersubjectively, as well
as objectively, based.
Another aspect of this non-modern authenticity is letting go of the self-appointed
master role, both with respect to ourselves and nature, associated with modernity. With
regards to ourselves, this means relinquishing the idea that we are these absolute choosers
with an unfettered and inherent freedom in the face of objects. Rather we must embrace
the more realistic, non-modern sense of agency that is derived from and contingent on its
network of relationships. What we are capable of, and the achievement of our goals,
depends on the network of relationships we have with both humans and nonhumans that
enable us to do so. As MacIntyre astutely points out, “Acknowledgment of dependence is
key to independence” (85). This is because, as he explains, without truthfully and
realistically acknowledging our dependency and attachment to others we are held captive
by them such that we cannot move beyond them. It is important here to remember
Bennett’s assertion that in addition to things being sources of resistance, as in their
traditional conception, they also have productive capacities – “thing-power” – in that
nonhuman materials with their autonomous possibilities and directedness have a defining
impact on the way events play out. Moreover, our very source of our freedom, and the
realization of it, is found in our relation and engagement with such things. De Beauvoir
provides a very useful and insightful portrayal of human freedom in asserting: “…to be
free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given
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toward an open future…” (91). Tying the two together, while nonhumans represent the
constraints of what is given in the present they simultaneously also co-constitute the
backdrop of possibility from which our future opens up and the mediating means through
which our freedom is concretely realized via actions. Thus, it is through realizing our
dependency on the material world that we find ourselves in a better, more able, situation
to make use of our freedom so as to make realistic plans for the future as well as the
necessary means and obstacles in the way of realizing those goals.
One practical implementation of this authenticity is that when it comes to caring
for ourselves, as well as others, our actions should not only be directed individually, but
on the network of relations that actively engage in our and their co-constitution. In this
light we should aim at strengthening the beneficial ones that foster and cultivate one’s
physical and mental well being in addition to their ethical character and conduct, while
weakening and supplementing those that are harmful or undesirable. Furthermore, in
cultivating oneself and pursuing various meaning giving life projects, we must give up
the idealistic attitude of immediate change in regards to making a decision, as well as,
having things exactly our way and bending matter to whatever way we will. Instead we
need to learn to work on ourselves through working with other nonhuman materials over
time such that we come to develop a mutual understanding, meaning we come to see
them not only in relation to ourselves but also in terms of their own directedness,
possibilities, and meaning as well as the integrity of the network of relations that sustains
them. In doing so, we will learn how to best surround ourselves with the appropriate
nonhumans to work with, and environments to work in, that are conducive to making
desirable choices and effective actions, having aligned programs of action, so as to
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realize our projects and goals and overall become who we want to become. Moreover, the
larger context of meaning they are associated with should contribute and express who we
want to be as a person and the values we want to be associated with, since as mediating
means they not only help us realize our ends but in process redefine them and their
integrity.
Another ethical corollary of this non-modern perspective, and in particular how
agency is understood as being derived from and dispersed through networks and time, is
that our conception of cause and assignment of responsibility must be stretched. Rather
than focusing on the detached individual existing solely in the present or societal issues at
large as the source of the blame, responsibility needs to be distributed throughout the
collective of human and nonhuman associations. In doing so we must also take into
consideration non-linear and emergent phenomenon, and the existence of composite
actors having a fusion of pre-existing programs of action. In these regards it is insightful
to recall Latour’s quote about how neither people nor planes fly alone, but rather, flying
is the result of all the associations that make up airlines. Similarly, when it comes to
composite actors, we must move beyond the subject-society and subject-object
dichotomies in assigning responsibility. For instance, in the gun debate Latour contends,
“It is neither people nor guns that kill. Responsibility for action must be shared among
various actants” (Pandora’s Hope 180). Among the various actants that share the
responsibility in this case would include the synergetic combination of societal causes,
along with familial up bring, that going into shaping the individual in conjunction with
the presence of nonhumans such as guns and their regulation and distribution. Instead of
singling out one of these factors, we must broaden the scope of our understanding and
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focus on the dynamic relationships between these actants under the assumption that an
individual never acts alone.
One last way this authenticity spells out pertains to how as hybrids we share the
property of embodiment, and like all bodily beings we will perish. As such, this nonmodern virtue is also an authenticity towards death. Like all other living things we will
die and in order to understand what it is to be human we must understand this. Moreover,
this is all the more penetrating as humans, as Heidegger so astutely pointed out, because
we have come to terms with our own death; that I as an individual will cease to exist at
some time. The inherent finitude of my life is marked by an uncertainty that is a darkness
of meaninglessness encompassing even the farthest outreaches of light that is my life.
Ultimately, this dark feature of human existence serves to illuminate one’s life by forcing
us to think about life, what kind of life do we want to lead, what kind of person do we
want to become, and what kind of meaning do we want to attribute to a life without
inherent meaning through the course of our life.47 Furthermore, this form of authenticity
is particularly pertinent for non-modernity as facing one’s own death puts into focus
some of the central concepts of modernity, such as uncertainty, lack of control, the
connection we have with the rest of nature, and the meaning that arises without essence.
Such thoughts cause us to slow down, pause for a moment, and take a step back to
47

After all, without essences there is no longer any answer at the back of the book defining who we are,
what we should strive to, and what is actually meaningful. Without this one right answer, the burden of
proof rest on our shoulders and can only be found and demonstrated in the course of one’s own life. As
such, like in real life science, we must turn to experimentation in order to figure this out for ourselves. In
doing so we literally become the test subject and life experiences are the experiments from which we can
come to understand ourselves based on performances, successes and failures, the effective capabilities we
demonstrate, along with the aversions and predilection elicited by interactions with certain others. While
some things are beyond the scope of this experimental method, another way to find out what to do with our
lives and what gives it meaning is by employing thought experiments. For instance, Nietzsche’s eternal
return allows us to abstract from the immediacy of our day-to-day lives and gain a perspective on the
entirety of our lives and what is meaningful by asking if we had to live this life over and over again what is
really worth doing, what would be willing to affirm for an entirety.
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reconsider and reevaluate life as whole as well as the relative importance and value of
various things in our life and the way we have and want to conduct our life. This slowing
down, as we will see shortly is a virtue in itself.
With the non-modern virtue of authenticity outlined in regards humans, we now
turn our attention to what authenticity means in relation to nonhumans and nature at
large. Let’s begin by returning to the idea that authenticity requires letting go of our selfappointed master role this time in relation to nature. Such fantasies of mastery were based
on the modern conception of nature as an inexhaustible reservoir of resources in the form
of passive, shapeless objects that we can bend to whatever way our will desires without
consequence given the divide between nature and society. This view is brought to light
by Heidegger’s analysis of the modern understanding of technology, in which nature is
revealed purely in terms of human use value as a standing reserve. Such an understanding
prompts humans to manipulate nature as we see fit so as to meet our needs. The problem
with this is that it conceals the autonomous structure and way of nature, which must be
respected to some threshold extent in order to maintain the integrity and functioning of
the system as whole as well as overall well-being of the organisms dependent on it.
Consequently, modernity failed to take into consideration the effects that our actions have
on nonhumans as well as the networks existing between them as a whole; much less the
repercussions that the disruption, short-circuiting, and destruction of the “natural order”
might have for us.48 Ultimately, this discounting and disfranchisement of nature as an
inexhaustible and brute means to human ends lead to the de-realization of its loss,
borrowing a phrase from Judith Butler, meaning moderns not only fail to consider the
significance of what is being lost but do not even realize its happening.
48
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The ruse of modernity came to end with the proliferation of problematic and
recalcitrant hybrids such as global warming, so it is fitting to end my discussion by
addressing such concerns as well as taking up the philosophical import of non-modernity
in regards to environmental ethics. With regards to the proliferation of undesirable,
disruptive, and destructive hybrids the virtue of slowing down and being more
universally considerate is imperative for the collective as a whole in facing these
problems and preventing future ones. Latour himself points this out, saying, “...we are
going to have to slow down, reorient and regulate the proliferation of monsters by
representing them officially” (We Have Never Been Modern 12). Latour’s work can thus
be seen as taking the first step in trying to regulate the proliferation of dangerous hybrids
by officially representing them via his hybrid ontology. In particular, given the intricacy
and complexity of the natural networks, the close connections between the state of nature
and the state of society, as exemplified by global warming, along with the co-constitution
of humans by nonhumans, in moving forward we must proceed with caution, be more
careful, and slow down so as to have the time for due diligence and thoroughly thinking
things through instead of absent mindedly taking up various practices of mediation that
gives rise to the production of hybrids. In doing so, we must consider a far wider range of
both direct and indirect effects on the nature-culture collective as a whole over both
human and natural time frames so as to try and prevent the careless introduction of
dangerous and detrimental hybrids. The idea being that “…those who think the most
about hybrids circumscribe them as much as possible, whereas those who chose to ignore
them by insulating them from any dangerous consequences develop them to the utmost”
(41). For instance, this might entail questioning the direction and degree of technological
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research that intervenes and replaces natural things and processes with artificial and
synthetic counterparts. In addition to considering the impact the practices of mediation
and introduction of hybrids might have on natural environments we must also take into
account their impact on the social landscape, on the essence of humanity, and an
individuals’ sense of self, e.g. the modern feeling of being estranged from nature and
alienated from ourselves and others. This is because nonhuman hybrids are not innocent
objects and passive tools but introduce ways of living, relating to the world, and impart
particular meanings to life; that is, hybrids can impact and create lifestyles, outlooks,
values, which reinforce certain social structures and ways of interacting with nature.
Ultimately, Latour declares, “This slowing down, this moderation, this regulation, is what
we expect from our morality. The fourth guarantee – perhaps the most important – is to
replace the clandestine proliferation of hybrids by their regulated and commonly-agreedupon production. It is time, perhaps, to speak of democracy again, but of a democracy
extended to things themselves” (142).
Such talk about a democracy of things highlights the overall versatility of the nonmodern perspective and the way in which it equally lends itself to environment ethics. In
particular, this idea suggest not only that the production of hybrids, e.g. via scientific
research, should be open to discussion and more frequently discussed, but also that all
things should get a say in the deliberative process of democracy such that their well-being
is represented and taken into consideration. One way non-modernity does this is by
elevating the status of all material, nonhuman actants, bestowing a greater sense of value
on them, both in their own right but also in relation to the roles they play in networks.
With regards to first form of bestowal of value, I am specifically referring to how in
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conceiving of the world as ontological continuum non-modernity reveals the way
nonhumans share human properties such as having agency, having a sense of
directedness, receptivity, openness of possibility to them, and autonomy to varying
degrees of complexity – ranging from the dirt on the ground to the elephant walking upon
it. As such, it extends our traditional, democratic, conception of respect so as to include
everything from minerals, to plants, to animals, to ecosystems. Indeed, Latour explicitly
asserts this:
We can define morality as uncertainty about the proper relation between means
and ends, extending Kant’s famous definition of the obligation “not to treat
Human beings simply as means but always also as ends” – provided that we
extend it to nonhumans as well…Ecological crises, as we have interpreted them,
present themselves as generalized revolts of the means: no entity – whale, river,
climate earthworm, tree, calf, cow, pig , brood – agrees any longer to be treated
“simply as a means” but insists on being treated “always also as an end.” (Politics
of Nature 155-156).
Finally, thinking through the hybrid nature of human existence seems to naturally
call for the expansion of care ethics so as to attend to relationships with humans as well
as nonhumans. Our newfound and greater sense of interdependency and intersubjectivity
give rise to greater circles of care. In Vibrant Matter, Bennett develops on this idea of
distributing value more generously to all bodies and points out how it is accompanied by
a newfound attentiveness, which, “…can inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all
bodies are kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And
in a knotted world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be
harm to oneself” (Vibrant Matter 13). This kinship with other bodies and nature in
general and the way in which all our well-beings are all bound up in webs of relationships
with one another, also gets at how the modern conception of self-interest and societynature dualism and the barriers they create for environmental ethics break down with the

66
relational ontology of non-modernity. Given the ways in which our physical well-being,
intentionality, capacities, and sense of self is bound up with networks of material things
both within and without, one’s own good, as well society’s at large, is not completely
separable from and to some degree intertwined with the good of nature. As such, caring
about ourselves and other humans entails caring about nonhumans and the network of
associations that exists between us and them, as well as the ones that independently exist
between them and them. While we might start caring about nature and nonhumans in
relation to ourselves, similar to the development of human relationships all too often
through the time shared with them we come to appreciate and value them in their own
right. Ultimately, this caring about affectively motivates and moves us to care for them.
In this way, the responsibility to care for other humans as well as nonhumans and nature
in general comes not from without in the form of external laws, but from within as a felt
internal obligation. Thus, in conclusion, not only does the conceptual change between
modernity and non-modernity prompt the need for new relations between humans and
themselves and other humans, but also new relations between humans and nature. The
difference that a cultural narrative makes in regards to our perception of and interaction
with the natural world is poignantly pointed out by Serres via Prigogine and Stengers:
“Where man is in the world, of the world, in matter, of matter, he is not a stranger,
but a friend, a member of the family, and an equal. He has a made a pact with
things. Conversely, many other systems and many other sciences are based on
breaking this pact. Man is a stranger to the world, to dawn, to the sky, to things.
He hates them, and fights them. His environment is a dangerous enemy to be
fought, to be kept enslaved” (Order out of Chaos 304-305).
While the intention of this paper was to bring into focus the basic character of
human existence in non-modernity, this in no way was meant to be the end of the
discussion. Rather the survey of the basic concepts of non-modernity and dimensions of
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quasi-subjectivity was intended to open up new discussions and shine a new light on old
discussions by providing the appropriate framework from which we should think about
our personal and social problems. This conceptual framework however was just a bare
bones sketch that outlined what it means to be human living in a hybrid world. In order to
develop this account future work would include fleshing out this outline so as to address
the specificity of our current human situation as well as the particularities of the problems
we face. For instance, considering specifically what nonhumans and quasi-objects fill our
world and the ways in which they co-constitute our identity and direct our agency.
Furthermore, while this work sought to highlight how humans are defined in relation to
other nonhumans and quasi-objects due to the lack of attention this has been given in the
past in order to articulate a more robust and normatively substantial ethic there needs to
more work done taking into account the social dimension of our constitution and its
relation to our quasi-object and nonhuman constitution. Upon doing so, such a nonmodern ethic must find and build political as well as social outlets. It must become a
public agenda that motivates governments and industries to supply the necessary social
resources and produce the appropriate nonhumans and quasi-objects which cultivate
ethical character and consciousness and enable people to pursue their own meaningful
and authentic sense of self. This can only come about through more open and regular
discussions about scientific and technological research and the development of consumer
markets and industry that question whether the directions these are taking and the quasiobjects they are giving rise to are ones we really want to follow and be associated with. In
pursuing these various projects we must seek to do our best to balance the interest of both
humans and nonhumans alike. While none of the questions raised will be easy and have
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straightforward answers in order to start to address the problems society is facing and
begin to live out a non-modern ethic it is crucial to at least start to think and talk more
publicly about these issues from a non-modern perspective which captures the
complexity and multiplicity of interest at stake.
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